Rhode Island: Rhode Island Mechanics’ Liens Statute Under Constitutional Attack
June 2, 2003
The April 23, 2003, decision by Justice Silverstein of
the Superior Court of Rhode Island may have a ripple effect beyond the Ocean
State if it is upheld on the expected appeal to the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island. In Sells/Greene Building Company, LLC v. Robert V. Rossi and Linda A.
Rossi, CA No-PB 02-1019 and Gem Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc. v. Robert V.
Rossi and Linda A. Rossi, C.A. No. PB 02-27781, Justice Silverstein dismissed
the mechanics’ lien claims of two contractors and held the Rhode Island
Mechanics’ Liens statute, G.L. 1956 §§ 34-28-1 to -37, to be unconstitutional
for its failure to provide due process rights prior to the taking of a
property interest, as required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution.
In reaching his conclusion, Judge Silverstein reviewed
the legacy of cases from the United States Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, the United States District Court for the
District of Rhode Island and the Supreme Court of Rhode Island that
invalidated various prejudgment garnishment, attachment and lien statutes on
the basis that they resulted in the unlawful taking of property rights from
individuals without the procedural protections of a hearing. Judge
Silverstein was not persuaded by the distinctions raised by Sells-Greene and
Gem, the Rhode Island Attorney General and various construction industry trade
associations2
and found that the effect of the statute was to compromise and
interfere with property interests without adequate procedural safeguards.
The case arises from a “vanilla” dispute about the
construction of a commercial office building in Smithfield, Rhode Island.
Sells/Greene was the general contractor for the project and Gem was a plumber
that had contracted directly with the property owners, Robert and Linda Rossi,
to install water and sewer lines to the project. In accordance with G.L. 1956
§§34-28-4 and -5, Sells/Greene and Gem both filed the required notice of
intention to do work or furnish materials or both in the land records for the
Town of Smithfield. Asserting that they had not been paid for work performed,
Sells/Greene and Gem then both filed timely petitions to enforce their
mechanics’ liens and notices of lis pendens pursuant to G.L. §§34-28-10 to
-13. In their respective petitions, Sells/Greene sought $129,808 and Gem
sought $35,500 for unpaid labor and materials. There were no procedural
defects in the lien filings of either Sells/Greene or Gem noted by the Court.
Pursuant to G.L. 1956 §34-28-17, the Rossi’s paid the
lien amounts plus costs into the registry of the Court and then filed motions
to dissolve and discharge the mechanics’ liens and notices of lis pendens in
each matter. The motions were granted by the Court, “stating that the amounts
being held on deposit by the registry of the Court are substituted to secure
any valid mechanics’ lien claim of the Petitioners.” The Rossi’s then
challenged the constitutionality of the liens, arguing that G.L. 1956
§§34-28-1 to -37 provides for a taking of property without due process, in
violation of both the United States Constitution and the Rhode Island
Constitution, and the Court agreed.
In reaching its decision, the Court appears to have been
troubled that the only remedy for a property owner to remove a lien, short of
the full hearing and ultimate determination on the merits long after the
initial lien filing, was posting a bond or depositing cash into the court
registry as security for the amounts claimed by lien petitioners. The Court
reasoned that either option could have a negative impact on the financial
interests of the owner that was incurable until a hearing on the merits was
concluded. The impairment of the owners’ interest was substantial enough, the
Court found, to constitute a taking of a property interest that required due
process protections.
Although a decision from the Rhode Island Superior Court
does not have precedential value, it suggests a path for challenging
mechanics’ liens statutes in other states that do not currently provide a
hearing scheme early on in the lien filing process.3 Thus, an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island (and perhaps even beyond) may trigger other
states to examine their procedural requirements for obtaining a mechanics’
lien. Even if the Sells/Greene decision is ultimately upheld on appeal,
however, it is unlikely that the Rhode Island lien law will be abolished all
together. The Rhode Island Legislature will likely move quickly to amend G.L.
§§28-34 to include a statutory scheme for an early hearing, either before or
immediately after the filing of the lien, to meet the constitutional
requirements.4 Other states facing similar constitutional lien challenges may
follow the same course of action.
For more information, call Mary Kaitlin McSally, toll
free, at 1-888-688-8500.
[1] As noted by the Court, the Sells/Greene petition and the
Gem petition were consolidated by agreement of the parties for consideration
of the constitutional challenge to the Mechanics’ Liens statute.
[2}The Attorney General, major construction and industry
trade associations were invited by the Court to file amicus curiae briefs on
the constitutional challenge to the Mechanics’ Liens statute.
[3]If tested, the expedited hearing procedures of the
Massachusetts Mechanics’ Liens statute set forth in M.G.L. c. 254 §15A might
provide sufficient constitutional safeguard because it affords the owner a
mechanism for an expedited review of the validity of the lien long before a
full determination on the merits. However, this process only applies to
claims that the lien filings are facially deficient. Absent a procedural
defect, a Massachusetts lien can only be resolved by a trial on the merits.
[4]One such corrective option may be to follow the lead of
the Maryland Mechanics Liens statute in which, prior to any lien encumbering
the property, the Court issues a show cause order allowing the owner to
dispute the validity of a lien petition, and provides for an expeditious show
cause hearing within 45 days thereafter. Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. §9-106.