Discrimination Because Employee "Perceived as" Gay Is Not Actionable Under Title VII
March 1, 2000
A former technician assistant in a county sheriff's department who alleged he
was sexually harassed and forced from his job because he was perceived as
"being or behaving like a homosexual or of not behaving in the 'required
manly' way," has no claim under Title VII, the Court of Appeals for the
Eight Circuit has ruled. Klein v. McGowan (8th Cir. Dec. 20, 1999).
In Klein, the plaintiff alleged that he was harassed by supervisors and
co-workers throughout the course of his 16-year tenure with the sheriff's
office, including repeatedly being called a "homo." He further alleged
that he was subject to discrimination in promotion and assignment of duties and
that he "would not have been treated the same way if he had been a
woman." The district court granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment, holding that, even if his timely allegations were sufficiently severe
or pervasive to be actionable under Title VII, the plaintiff could not establish
that the alleged harassment was based on his sex.
Relying on the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc. (1998), in which the Supreme Court held that same-sex
harassment is actionable under Title VII, the district court explained that,
when determining whether alleged harassment is based on the victim's sex, the
court must examine "whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other
sex are not exposed." Noting that the plaintiff's workplace was almost
entirely male, and that there was no allegation that anyone other than the
plaintiff was subjected to the alleged harassing conduct, the district court
concluded the plaintiff could not meet the burden of showing that one sex was
treated differently than the other sex.
The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the harassment was based on
sex because it was based on "the sexual aspect of plaintiff's
personality." Recognizing that, in essence, the plaintiff was asserting
that he was harassed because he was perceived as being a homosexual, the court
stated "it is well settled that Title VII does not recognize a cause of
action for discrimination based on sexual orientation." The court further
explained that Title VII does not prohibit harassment of a male because of
effeminate behavior, the perception that he is gay, or because of animus toward
the sexual aspect of one's personality.
In affirming the summary judgment, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
that the incidents occurring within the limitations period did not amount to
severe or pervasive conduct and that the plaintiff did not establish that they
were "tied to sex."
The Klein decision reaffirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination
or harassment based upon an employee's sexual orientation. Employers need to be
aware, however, that they may be subject to state or local laws that prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. For example, the District of
Columbia Human Rights Act, the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Act, the
Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, and the California Fair Employment
and Housing Act include sexual orientation as an unlawful basis for
discrimination in employment. And the New York City Human Rights Law proscribes
discrimination based on one's "actual or perceived ...sexual
orientation."
For more information please call Robert J. Crohan at 1-888-688-8500.