Age-Wave Waivers: Experiencing the Enforcement Riptide
July 3, 2001
Your company has fired a worker due to her misconduct. As she is being
terminated, the worker claims the termination is the result of sex
discrimination. Although you are comfortable with your decision to terminate, to
avoid the nuisance of a lawsuit, you agree to pay the employee in exchange for a
release of all claims that she could have against the company, including any
employment discrimination claims. Although the worker is over 40, you do not
believe that there are any Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA) issues
implicated. You know that the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA)
imposes certain requirements for age-claim waivers, but meeting those
requirements is, in your opinion, over-kill for the situation. When you consider
the consequences of asking for an invalid age waiver as part of the release of
all claims, you believe that the only risk is that the employee could come back
and file an age claim against your company. You conclude that there is no basis
for an age discrimination claim, so you do not comply with all of OWBPA's
requirements.
Is your decision this simple?
Not according to the court in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Bull HN
Information Systems, Inc., an opinion from the U.S. District Court, District of
Massachusetts (May 29, 2001). Among other things, Bull HN involved allegations
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts that General Release and Severance Agreements (Releases) used by
Bull HN from July 1994, through 2000 in connection with a series of
reductions-in-force violated OWBPA and ADEA. In addition, an individual claimant
(Robert F. Madigan) asserted that the release he signed violated the OWBPA and
the ADEA. In partially granting the EEOC's and the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts' Motion for Summary Judgment, the court found "The
Commonwealth and the EEOC are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their
allegations regarding the unlawful Releases used by Bull from July 1994 -
December 1997." The court granted equitable relief to Madigan solely on the
basis of the invalidity of the waiver he signed when he was laid off. While it
declined to grant monetary damages on the basis of his waiver claim, the court
issued a declaration that the waiver was invalid, ordered that the employer
provide all employees who entered into similar waivers with a copy of the
court's decision, and ordered that the employer provide Madigan with the
information mandated by OWBPA for an effective waiver.
Bull HN builds on the 1998 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Oubre v. Entergy
Operations, Inc. (1998), which held in a non-RIF situation that an invalid
waiver could not bar an employee's age discrimination claim even though the
employee had not returned the money she received for signing a general waiver of
all claims. The court failed to address whether an employer could claim that a
payment made in exchange for an invalid wage could reduce the damages awarded to
an employee who later prevailed on a substantive age discrimination claim. The
EEOC issued regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.23 (2000), effective January 10,
2001, based on Oubre. These regulations include a provision stating that courts
have the discretion to determine whether an employer is entitled to a reduction
of the employee's monetary award in the amount of the waiver payment.
Loosely basing its decision on the holding from Oubre that the contract law
doctrine of ratification could not save a release that violates OWBPA, Oubre,
Bull HN found that an invalid waiver could expand the statute of limitation for
age claims and warrant other equitable relief. According to Bull HN, to find
otherwise would "permit[ ] (indeed encourage[ ]) employers to design
unlawful waivers that do not recommend consulting an attorney, or that otherwise
mislead employees about their potential age discrimination claims, in the hopes
that after they leave their position, they will be sufficiently confused to sit
on their rights until the ADEA's limitations period has expired."
Shortly after the decision, the EEOC issued a press release (June 12, 2001)
touting the decision as a victory and characterizing Bull HN as a ruling that
the company had "discriminated against older workers in severance
programs." The press release also quoted Commission Chairwoman Ida L.
Castro as saying "unlawful waivers that strip older workers of their rights
under the ADEA will be pursued by the EEOC to the fullest extent of the
law." It should be of special concern to employers that the EEOC has seized
upon Bull HN's finding that an invalid waiver is a violation of ADEA and OWBPA
and that it has already expanded upon the apparent application of that case. The
EEOC's position also appears to be inconsistent with the cautious concurrence in
Oubre (by Justices Breyer and O'Connor) that finding a waiver invalid under the
OWBPA means that the contract between the employer and employee is voidable, but
that it still carries legal effect.
At this point, the cumulative message of OWBPA, Oubre, Bull HN, and the
EEOC's enthusiasm about the Bull HN decision is clear: Employers who consider
using invalid age waivers face more than just the possibility of a substantive
claim under ADEA. The employer could also face enforcement action by the EEOC.
The employer should consider that a court may treat the invalid waiver as an
independent violation of law and may order the employer to provide additional
equitable relief to the plaintiff, including providing plaintiff with all of the
information required by OWBPA, even without the expectation of a valid waiver in
return.
Until there is further guidance on the issue of age waivers, employers should
avoid using waivers of claims for the growing population of workers in the Age
Wave without full compliance with OWBPA, meaning:
- the waiver must be in writing and be understandable
- it must specifically refer to ADEA rights or claims
- it may not waive claims that arise in the future
- it must be in exchange for payment
- it must advise the individual in writing to consult an attorney before
signing the waiver
- it must provide the individual at least 21 days to consider the agreement
(or at least 45 days if part of a reduction-in-force) and at least 7 days to
revoke the agreement after signing it, and
- if it is part of a reduction-in-force, it must inform the individual in a
manner calculated to be understood by the average individual eligible to
participate, as to -
- the group of individuals eligible to be or actually laid-off, any
eligibility factors for the lay-off, and any time limits of the lay off, and
- the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible to be or actually
laid-off, and the ages of all individuals in the same job classification or
organizational unit who are not eligible to be or actually laid-off
For more information please contact Madonna A. McGwin at 1-888-688-8500 or at
mamcgwin@hklaw.com.