Construing Patent Claim Preambles: Understanding "Life, Meaning and Vitality"
May 13, 2003
Michael Colitz - Tampa
Patent claims are the most critical component of any patent application. These
single-sentence legal descriptions serve to define the metes and bounds of the
intellectual property. However, the language within a claim is always open to
interpretation. For this reason, courts typically interpret, or construe,
patent claims in order to determine both their meaning and scope. One source of
continual debate among patent litigants is whether the introductory portion of a
claim, known as the preamble, should be construed as limiting the scope of the
claim, or whether it just defines a nonlimiting purpose of the invention. The
absence of any easily applied rules for construing preambles means that the
debate is sure to continue.
The preamble is just one of three parts in a typical patent
claim, with the remaining parts being the transition and body. The transition
links the preamble to the body of the claim and indicates whether the claim is
opened or closed. Opened claims, signified by the transition “comprising,” are
infringed if a competing device has at least all of the recited claim elements.
Closed claims, signified by the transition “consisting of,” are only infringed
if the competing device has no more or less than all the recited elements.
The body comes after the transition and lists
the various elements that form the structures, steps or parts of the claimed
invention. The elements listed in the body undisputedly limit the scope of the
claim. By contrast, the preamble is typically used as a means of broadly
defining the invention and is similar to the title of the invention.
Accordingly, the preamble is often used by the Patent & Trademark Office in
assigning patent applications to a particular examining art unit and in
classifying the invention. Nonetheless, similar to the body, the preamble can
recite structures, steps and parts that limit the overall scope of the claim.
Whether elements recited in a preamble should be construed
as limiting the scope of the claim is an issue the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) has visited on numerous occasions. Most patent
litigators are familiar with the various tests for construing claim preambles.
The most frequently quoted CAFC test requires a limiting construction for the
preamble if it is “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to the
claim. 1
The CAFC has also noted that “when the claim drafter chooses to use
both the preamble and the body to define the subject matter of the claimed
invention, the invention so defined, and not some other, is the one the patent
protects.”2 Conversely if the “body of the claim sets out the complete
invention,” then the language of the preamble is “superfluous.” 3 In practice,
these statements do little to aid in claim construction and merely serve to
frame the ultimate issue: when does the preamble serve to limit the invention?
An analysis of one recent CAFC decision helps shed light on
the proper manner of construing preambles. In Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l,
2003 WL 1562153 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the CAFC considered a district court’s
interpretation of a claim on a vehicular transmission shift control system. The
claim at issue was a method claim that contained a lengthy preamble reciting
various structural elements of the vehicle driveline system. The preamble also
contained numerals referencing the portions of the specification and drawings
that more fully described the driveline. Eaton, the patent owner, argued that
the structures in the preamble did not limit the claim, and that the invention
was merely defined by the two steps recited in the body.
The first step recited “retaining said vehicle master
clutch (8) engaged during the gear ratio shift in said drive train.” The second
step recited “urging said first and second members of said first clutch into a
disengaged condition.” In each step, those structures introduced by “said” were
first described in the preamble of the claim. Thus, each claim element relied
upon the preamble for antecedent basis. The district court interpreted the
preamble as not limiting the claim. A jury subsequently found that defendant
Meritor literally infringed the claim and that the infringement was willful.
The CAFC, in reversing the district court’s construction,
concluded that the structures recited in the preamble limited the scope of the
claim. The CAFC reasoned that the steps required manipulation of the specific
driveline structures detailed in the preamble such that the steps could not be
performed without the referenced driveline system. Namely, the first step
required manipulation of the master clutch and the second step required
manipulation of the first and second members of the first clutch. Additionally,
the CAFC construed the first step as necessarily being performed during the
particular sequence outlined in the preamble. That is, the first step was
performed during the gear ratio shift described in the preamble. Accordingly,
in the view of the CAFC, the body of the claim only made sense with reference to
the preamble; therefore, the preamble gave “life, meaning and vitality” to the
claim and was a limitation on claim scope. Thus, the CAFC reversed the
district court’s claim construction, and it further reversed the jury verdict of
literal infringement, noting that it was undisputed that the accused device did
not employ the driveline system recited in the preamble.
In reaching this conclusion, the CAFC was careful to note
the differences between Eaton’s patent claim and the claim asserted by Vaupel in
Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia, S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870 (Fed.
Cir. 1991). Vaupel concerned a method claim directed to forming a plurality of
patterned strips of fabric woven from threads of synthetic material. The
preamble of the claim at issue in Vaupel recited a “broad weaving machine”
having a “sley” and a “breast beam.” The body of the claim recited a step of
“guiding the woven fabric leaving the position where the sley beats up the
fabric to allow movement towards the breast beam of said machine, but not in the
opposite direction.” Thus, like the claim in Eaton, the step referenced
structures that were only described within the preamble. Nonetheless, the
district court concluded that the language in the preamble did not constitute a
structural limitation and also concluded that the claim was infringed.
The CAFC affirmed both the district court’s claim
construction and its infringement determination in favor of Vaupel. The CAFC
reasoned that the term “breast beam” did not mean a specific loom part but was
rather a general reference to an area at the front of a loom. Additionally, the
CAFC concluded that the terms sley and breast beam were only used to fix the
direction of movement of the woven fabric on the loom. Thus, unlike the claim
in Eaton, the claim in Vaupel did not recite a step that required manipulation
of structures described in the preamble. Rather, the preamble in Vaupel was
merely a frame of reference, both for the location of the invention upon a loom
and the movement of fabric relative to the loom. Thus, the preamble did not
give “life, meaning and vitality” to the remainder of the claim.
Eaton and Vaupel make it apparent that there are no easily
applied universal rules in construing preambles. Instead, a proper construction
can only be achieved by a complete understanding of the invention. The preamble
and body of the claims at issue must then be analyzed in light of this
understanding. Only by way of such a detailed analysis can one apprehend whether
a preamble is necessary for “life, meaning and vitality.”
For more information, call Michael Colitz, toll free, at
1-888-688-8500.
[1] Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182
F.3d 1298, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
[2] Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink
Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
[3] Schumer v. Lab. Computer Systems, Inc., 308 F.3d
1304, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2002).