South Carolina Weekly Newspaper Wins Libel Appeal
 
October 24, 2006
 
Judith Frances Bonilla - Washington

The South Carolina Court of Appeals recently affirmed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment for a newspaper, finding that a public official failed to show actual malice to support his claims of libel, civil conspiracy and invasion of privacy.

In Metts v. Mims, Robert Metts, the deputy assistant administrator of Berkley County, South Carolina, sued because of a story that ran in a weekly newspaper, The Independent. The July 2003 story concerned the constitutionality of a controversial work policy established by Metts’ boss that allowed county employees to perform yard work on private property. The article quoted Judy Mims, a county council member, as saying that “[A] constituent called [her] … about seeing county trucks in Robbie Metts’ driveway in Pinopolis, and employees cutting limbs from trees in his yard.”

Metts called the day after the article and said the statement was false. Mims also called the reporter who wrote the story and claimed that she never gave the quote. The newspaper ran a correction: “Mrs. Mims told The Independent she would like to correct [the previous statement] to say that constituents told her they had seen county trucks in [Metts’s] yard … . Metts told The Independent that what was reported ‘was not the least bit accurate.’”

Metts sued both the newspaper and Mims. The newspaper sought summary judgment on the grounds that Metts, a public official, could not establish that the newspaper acted with the requisite constitutional malice in publishing the statements. The trial court agreed, finding no evidence suggesting that the reporter and newspaper were “aware the contested quote was false, or that it acted with reckless disregard as to the truth of Mims’s allegations.”

In addition, the newspaper appealed the trial court’s order holding it in contempt for declining to produce financial documents to Metts in discovery. The newspaper had argued that the information was only relevant to punitive damages, and that claim would never get to a jury due to the lack of evidence of actual malice. When the newspaper refused to comply with the trial court’s order compelling discovery, the trial court held it in contempt. The trial court, however, agreed with the newspaper’s argument that if it complied with the discovery order, the newspaper would lose the right to appeal because the issue would be moot. The trial court therefore held the contempt sanctions in abeyance to allow the newspaper to appeal. The trial court initially also had held the newspaper’s summary judgment motion in abeyance; however, the trial judge changed his mind and summary judgment was later awarded to the newspaper. Both rulings went up on appeal.

The Court of Appeals first addressed the trial court’s procedural decision, finding that the decision to allow the summary judgment motion to proceed served the interest of judicial economy. The appellate court next addressed the grant of summary judgment. In a defamation case, a public figure or official must prove actual malice – that the defendant published the defamatory statement knowing it was false or with reckless disregard – by clear and convincing evidence. Metts argued that he had established actual malice by the requisite quantum of proof because of evidence that the reporter knew that Mims had an adversarial relationship with Metts’ boss, the county supervisor. Metts also pointed out that the reporter received an official list of people who had county employees perform work at their homes, and Metts’ name was not on it.

The Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. Noting actual malice is “a subjective standard that tests a defendant’s good faith belief in the truth of the published statement,” it held that “the evidence yields only one conclusion – that the reporter subjectively believed the truth of Mims’ statement.” Although subjective awareness of falsity can be shown if there are “obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports,” the appellate court held that the reporter’s awareness of the animosity did not constitute obvious reasons to doubt Mims’ statement.

The appellate court also held that failure to investigate in and of itself is insufficient to establish reckless disregard and therefore rejected Metts’ attempts to establish actual malice on that basis as well.

We agree with the circuit court that the evidence indicates the reporter failed to investigate due to time constraints and a number of other obligations, including numerous editorial and administrative tasks. Although the reporter’s actions may have been negligent, we cannot say that they constituted an extreme departure from the standards of investigation normally employed by publishers so as to rise to the level of constitutional malice.

Finally, because the Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for the newspaper, it did not address the merits of the contempt order.

 

For more information, e-mail Judith F. Bonilla at judith.bonilla@hklaw.com or call toll free, 1-888-688-8500.