Iowa Adopts Defamation by Implication in Public Figure Libel Cases
 
May 15, 2007
 

The Supreme Court of Iowa has expressly authorized claims of defamation by implication in cases brought by public figures, allowing part of a claim to proceed against the Ames Tribune despite the trial court’s dismissal of the entire lawsuit. The rationale expressed by the state’s highest court, however, would only apply to future plaintiffs who can show a journalist reported true statements while at the same time implying something that he or she knew was false.

In the decision, Stevens v. Iowa Newspapers, Inc., plaintiff Todd Stevens had opted out of his freelance position as a sports writer at the newspaper after the Tribune declined to publish one of his opinion columns. The column concerned the resignation of Iowa State University’s associate athletic director. The Tribune, however, published a farewell column by Stevens in a “point-counterpoint” format, adjacent to a column written by a reporter. Three statements made in the reporter’s column became the basis of Stevens’ libel action: (1) that Stevens “rarely attended events upon which he wrote columns”; (2) that Stevens’ original, unpublished column on the ISU associate athletic director’s resignation contained “numerous factual errors”; and (3) that Stevens wrote “near libelous characterizations” in the unpublished column.

The trial court granted the defense motion for summary judgment and held that Stevens, who conceded that he was a public figure, had failed to establish clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. The appellate court reversed, finding that the statement that Stevens rarely attended events that he wrote about implied a conclusion that the reporter knew to be false – in fact, the reporter admitted in deposition that she knew that personal attendance at sporting events is not required by professional standards for sports opinion.

The Supreme Court of Iowa on March 9, 2007, affirmed the appellate court’s decision, and in so doing, expressly adopted defamation by implication and concluded that it is available to public figure plaintiffs. The court recognized the factual accuracy of the statement that Stevens “rarely attended events upon which he wrote columns” – he attended approximately 18 percent of the events he wrote about – but placed particular emphasis on the reporter’s statement in her deposition admitting that she knew sports opinion columnists are not required under professional standards to personally attend sporting events. The court further observed that the reporter used the fact of Stevens’ non-attendance as an implication that he was unprofessional. Because the reporter withheld the fact that Stevens’ conduct did not in fact violate professional standards, the court found that there was a factual issue for the jury regarding actual malice – which requires public figures to prove a journalist knew the information he or she reported was false or entertained serious doubts.

With respect to the other two statements – that Stevens’ original, unpublished column contained “factual errors” and “near libelous characterizations” – the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defense, noting:

• It was in fact true that Stevens’ original, unpublished column contained factual errors and “there was no evidence that even impliedly suggested that facts were withheld in the Tribune article (as in the Tribune’s statement about Stevens not attending events about which he wrote) that could make the ‘factual errors’ statement libelous.”

• The statement that Stevens’ original column contained nearly libelous statements “is so nebulous it is incapable, as a matter of law, of bearing a defamatory meaning.”

For more information, e-mail Christina LaRosa at christina.larosa@hklaw.com or call toll free, 1-888-688-8500.