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Dennis L. Bryant
Senior Counsel
New York

Dennis Bryant focuses his practice primarily on the regulation of the maritime industry. He monitors international conventions, federal and state statutes and regulations, and court...

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J. Michael Cavanaugh assists clients with development of infrastructure projects in the energy and utilities, transportation and communications industries. He has represented clients...

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Articles & White Papers
Regulatory, Government and Security

The Accident of Strict Liability
 
November 5, 2004
 
Dennis L. Bryant- New York

There are two so-called ‘strict liability’ criminal statutes in the United States that strike fear into hearts of merchant mariners and raise issues for Coast Guard personnel concerned with regulating the merchant marine, protecting the environment, and enforcing the law.  These two statutes are the Refuse Act of 1899 and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918.  Neither one is required to be viewed as creating strict liability for those who do not fully comply with their provisions, but, due to unfortunate accidents of history, that is the current general interpretation.

Refuse Act of 1899

The Refuse Act of 1899 is the codified portion of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of March 3, 1899.  Among its numerous other sections, the Appropriation Act included a provision stating that it was illegal to throw, discharge, or deposit any refuse matter of any kind or description from a ship or from the shore into navigable waters of the United States.  The provision was designed to deter use of waterways as garbage dumps, which was a significant problem at the time. 

The statute was loosely worded and included no reference to intent or mens rea.  The term ‘mens rea’ means the state of mind indicating culpability which is required as an element in most crimes.  At common law, criminal liability was invariably accompanied by criminal intent.  While a person who unintentionally harmed another might be civilly liable, the government did not impose a criminal sanction unless the harm was intentional or reckless.  As Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. said in classic book The Common Law: “Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.”

In interpreting the Refuse Act of 1899, early courts declined to read the statute literally and inserted an intent requirement before upholding the criminal conviction of an individual.  Thus, in a 1906 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the court upheld the liability of the ship in rem for a discharge unaccompanied by intent, but struck down the conviction of the individuals involved.  The court stated: “Section 16 of the act in question [the Refuse Act], in declaring the personal punishment, uses well-known common-law terms . . . thus unmistakably recognizing and intending tests of criminality which exist under general rules of proceedings against persons charged with misdemeanors.” 

In 1915, a number of proceedings against various tugs and scows operating in New York harbor were brought before the federal district court in a consolidated action.  All of the cases involved dumping of refuse outside the permitted area.  The court upheld the assessment of penalties against the various tugs and scows, except in one instance.  In that case, while the dumping occurred outside the permitted area, evidence showed that the scow had been recently overhauled and also inspected immediately before the incident.  The dumping occurred because the pawl restraining the load suddenly broke.  In dismissing the action, the court stated: “Defective machinery is, by the terms of the statute, no excuse.  I think, however, that defective machinery means machinery unsuited for the purpose or out of repair, and does not refer to a sudden breaking down of properly installed and inspected machinery.”  In other words, where the owner had acted prudently and the accidental dumping occurred anyway, no criminal liability would attach.

It was only later that courts started interpreting the Refuse Act literally and ruled that individuals could be held strictly liable for any discharge of refuse into navigable waters. 

 Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918

At the beginning of the twentieth century, it was determined that hunting was decimating migratory birds in North America.  The governments of Canada and the United States entered into a treaty to cooperatively regulate the protection afforded to birds that migrate through the two nations.  The treaty established closed seasons for specific migratory game birds, migratory insectivorous birds, and certain other migratory non-game birds “during which no hunting shall be done.”  The taking of nests or eggs of these birds was also prohibited, as well as the shipment or export of such birds or bird parts or their eggs.  To implement the treaty, Congress enacted the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918.  The Act makes it unlawful to pursue, hunt, take, capture, or kill any bird protected by the treaty. 

The courts, as they did with the Refuse Act, started reading the Migratory Bird Treaty Act literally.  Persons were being convicted for killing migratory birds even though they presented evidence indicating that they did not know the birds they shot at were migratory.  Persons who shot birds attracted to baited fields were being convicted even though they presented evidence indicating that they did not know the field in question was baited.  The courts ruled that the Act did not include a provision requiring mens rea on the part of the violator. 

Review of the Migratory Bird Treaty reveals that it was clearly focused on controlling intentional acts – hunting.  The Act was intended to implement the treaty and generally uses terms such as pursue, hunt, attempt to take, offer for sale, and deliver for shipment, which clearly denote volitional acts.  There is nothing in the treaty that mandates strict liability.  In fact, the Act was recently amended to change the court-interpretation that hunting from a baited field is a strict liability crime.  In accordance with a 1998 amendment, hunting from a baited field is only an offense if the person knows or reasonably should know that the area is baited.

It was not until the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill in 1989 that federal prosecutors started charging masters and ship owners with violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.  Now, such charges seem to have become routine in those instances where it has been decided to criminalize an oil spill in the United States.  Such an assertion is relatively easy, since virtually every bird in the United States has been designated as a migratory bird – whether it actually migrates or not.

 Impact

The unfortunate confluence of the Refuse Act of 1899 and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 is that virtually any oil spill into U.S. waters can be treated as a criminal event if a zealous federal prosecutor so elects.  This is not to say that some spills are not correctly pursued as criminal actions, but such unbridled discretion in the hands of a prosecutor is dangerous.  Criminal charges may be brought or pursued for inappropriate reasons.  Fear of such possible prosecutions is causing masters and others involved in marine casualties to refuse to cooperate with Coast Guard and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigations.  As was stated in the Coast Guard’s “After-Action” Report following the 1997 Spill of National Significance (SONS 97) Exercise:

Coast Guard enforcement will eventually be considered during the response, but may well be affected by the actions of the local United States Attorneys and state attorneys general/local prosecutor(s).  The Coast Guard may be able to influence, but may not be able to control the action of these officials.  As indicated by private counsel at the exercise, senior management of foreign shipping companies commonly spend very little time in the U.S. following a spill in order to avoid arrest by local officials.  Federal and state prosecutors may well attempt to take action prior to the departure of these corporate officials.  It was the consensus of the Executive Discussion Group and the Philadelphia Seminar that the criminal investigation should not be allowed to interfere with the top priority, which is to proceed with the cleanup and stop additional oil discharge.  In addition, the chilling effect of an aggressive, ill-timed, criminal investigation on the cooperative relationship desired for an effective crises response is unfortunate.  This issue requires more discussion and policy guidance.

Investigation of the root cause of the grounding of and oil spill from the bulk carrier NEW CARISSA was stymied when the master refused to testify at the investigation, citing his right against self-incrimination.  The vessel had dragged anchor and been blown ashore on the Oregon coast on February 4, 1999.  The incident was widely reported in the press and had significant political ramifications in the state.  The U.S. Attorney announced the opening of a criminal investigation shortly before the master was scheduled to testify.

In a rare instance of independent analysis, a federal judge in Idaho in 1989 refused to convict a farmer of violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act after geese died eating alfalfa in a field that the farmer had sprayed with a registered herbicide.  The court stated:

A homeowner could be pursued under the [Migratory Bird Treaty Act] if a flock of geese crashed into his plate-glass window and were killed.  An airplane pilot could be prosecuted if geese were sucked into his jet engines.  A farmer . . . could be exposed to sanctions because he tended his crops in the same manner as other area farmers.  These examples make one queasy about the reach of strict liability criminal statutes.

Conclusion

The point of this extended discussion is that it is a mere accident of poor legislative drafting by Congress and poor analysis by courts that these two statutes are interpreted as creating strict criminal liability.  There is no evidence that such was the intent of Congress when the bills were prepared.  If Congress intended these laws to create strict criminal liability, it certainly knew how to clearly evidence that intent.  Much damage has been done and little benefit has been gained by the current interpretation of these statutes.  At a minimum, Coast Guard marine casualty investigations have been impeded because mariners are afraid of potential criminal liability for even non-negligent acts.  It is time to rectify this historical accident and clarify the reach of these two statutes.