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Andrew Stephenson

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Andrew W. Stephenson practices in the areas of construction, labor law and corporate compliance, representing owners, architect-engineers, general contractors, and subcontractors in...

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Articles & White Papers

Application Of Toxic Tort Economics To Construction Litigation
 
March 15, 1995
 

Work on both residential and commercial construction projects invariably entails the need for water; plumbing; copper tubing; flux; mastics; joints; wallboard; roofing; sheetrock; taping compounds; insulation; heating; ventilation; and air conditioning; powerlines; and so forth. Parties involved in such projects must be aware of the composition of various construction materials, their possible interactions with other compounds and solvents, as well as with what is under the ground on which the project is being built. This is because there exists a serious risk of complex and protracted litigation having significant economic consequences of even peripheral players. Use of creative strategies and foresight, however, can successfully minimize potential economic harm.

The potential for mass litigation present in virtually all construction projects is precisely why builders, contractors, and suppliers must be concerned about the environmental implications of their work.

  • The Blue Water Paradigm.

In 1990 and 1991, in Contra Costa County (a suburban county across the bay from San Francisco), five residential subdivisions were built in a semi-rural area nestled in the hills. The residents of hundreds of these new homes were unable to use their tap water for drinking, cooking, or bathing, however, because it contained excessive amounts of copper that could cause flu-like symptoms. As a result of these excessive copper levels, the water was bright blue. Three years and a host of related lawsuits later, a debate still rages over the source of the copper that caused the "blue water".

When the problem first came to light in 1990, a special investigative committee-comprised of representatives of developers, the East Bay Municipal Utility District (water district), the Contra Costa County Department of Health, and their consultants – was formed to address the problems of displaced residents and to identify both the cause or causes of the problem and a cure for the tainted water. The committee’s efforts were unsuccessful, however, and a myriad of lawsuits followed. The homeowners sued the water district and the developers, who, in turn, filed cross-complaints against the general contractors, subcontractors, manufacturers, distributors, and suppliers of all types of plumbing fixtures. They also sued the realtors who sold the property and the lenders that financed the purchases of individual homes.

In order to determine the cause of the blue water, the developers built model homes where, using the water and pipe samples, they could experiment with the possible remedies (e.g., flushing the home plumbing systems with a citric acid solutions). After the developers’ efforts proved fruitless, the water district increased the level of chlorine in its water treatment protocol. While it was widely accepted that (a) the water’s bluish coloration was the result of excessive levels of copper in the water, and (b) the copper was somehow leaching out of the water pipes, it was not apparent why this was so and whether the affected piping was why this blue water phenomenon was unique to these subdivisions in Contra Costa County and not experienced elsewhere in the country where the same types and brands of copper tubing, flux, and other plumbing materials were used.

A special master of discovery issues was appointed by the Contra Costa County Superior Court to administer this large complex litigation. The special master severed the construction defect claims- raised by a number of the homeowners-from the blue water claims. Initially, the cases were consolidation under one caption. However, as homeowners in different subdivisions filed new cases, the loosely managed consolidation unraveled.

Faced with the above situation, a questions arises as to what a counsel should do to protect his or her client’s interests. The answer to this question depends on whom counsel represents. Strategies and tactics useful in managing toxic case problems can also be applied in construction litigation. Thus, counsel representing one of the target defendants will want to work toward extricating his or her client as early as possible from the litigation – thereby avoiding heavy transactional costs (for example, in the blue water cases, the volume of daily mail which had to be reviewed was so great the a case clerk was needed to file and organize it). If extracation is not possible, counsel should form a enact specific case management orders, with the proviso that failure to comply with such orders will result in dismissal of the case. The case management order must be fashioned such that it requires the plaintiff to establish a casual nexus linking a defendant’s product with causing plaintiff’s specific injury or damage. Courts, in such large cases, prefer to group the defendants for each case management. The groupings in this case naturally fell into categories of manufacturers, distributors, suppliers, applicators, lenders, realtors, etc.

Initial cases review and analysis must focus on analyzing who brought in the client into the litigation and why. In the blue water case, the interesting fact was that one party, a supplier, was not sued by the plaintiffs, but instead initially was sued by the plumbers and other suppliers on indemnity cross-complaints. At the outset, the supplier made informal requests of these codefendants for discovery, followed closely by requests for voluntary dismissal. Unfortunately, since transactional costs for the cross-complainants were already so substantial at the point the cross-complaints were served, the goal of serving more defendants was to share the expense and burden of bringing in more cross-defendants-i.e., the manufacturers. Like a chain letter, the idea was to sue right up the chain and pass it on.

Because it appeared that there would by no productive purpose in simply participating in the typical reactive process of sending out cross-complaints against the manufacturers and others (a tack that would surely have promoted reciprocal cross-complaints against the distributor) thereby leading to more cross-complaints from which to get dismissed, a different strategy was devised. The fundamental meaning of a cross-complaint is the supplier would only be potentially liable to the cross-complainants to the extent that those cross-complainants ever became obligated to compensate the plaintiffs because of the supplier’s conduct. It was, therefore, to the supplier’s advantage to be named in as few cross-complaints as possible (hence no knee jerk cross-complaints were filed by the distributor) and to work, after product and site specific informal discovery, toward setting directly with plaintiffs. It soon became evident that the cross-complainants who brought the supplier in were unwilling to dismiss the supplier because those cross-complainants did not know the cause of the blue water and, therefore, could not assess the relative liabilities for the homeowner’s damages. Moreover, the more defendants present, the more entities there were to contribute toward settlement. Likewise the manufacturers, who were brought into the lawsuits by another supplier, did not accept any tender of defense because they also "did not know the cause of the blue water". The refrain "you can’t get out because we don’t know the cause of the blue water" became a familiar one – and the costs continued to mount. Therefore, extricating a small player with little or no liability from this spider’s web before being strangled to death in transactional costs became paramount.

Instead of simply taking "no" for an answer and participating in protracted and costly litigation, the decision was made, after discussions with the supplier, to negotiate a settlement directly with the plaintiffs in the one of 14 lawsuits where informal discovery could place the supplier at the site. Plaintiffs’ counsel enthusiastically embraced this idea, even granting the supplier a "discount" for being the first litigant to settle. Significantly, settlement dollars were only paid to plaintiffs who lived in a development where the evidence indicated plumbing materials furnished by the supplier were installed. The plaintiffs’ attorney called a "town meeting" where the proposed settlement and soliciting writing consent to the agreement. All those homeowners responded by accepting the settlement, and the supplier was dismissed from the case. Then came the "battle" – i.e., litigation of the good faith of the settlement. Why would this be a battle? Because one party was getting out of the lawsuit thereby leaving a smaller pool of contributors to the settlement pot for all 14 cases.

At first, the Contra Costa County Superior Court granted the motion for an order determining the good faith of the settlement and dismissing all cross-complaints. Despite adequate notice, however, not all parties appeared at this hearing. When word of the court’s ruling circulated, one of the dismissed parties moved for reconsideration. With more objecting parties in attendance, the court subsequently granted the motion of reconsideration and reversed its prior ruling, holding that because the cause of the blue water was "unknown", the motion for good faith settlement was premature. After discussions with the client, the decision was made to writ the ruling. Within a few months, the California Court of Appeal upheld the client’s position by issuing a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to reconsider its change of position. Thereafter, the trial court found the settlement to be in good faith and dismissed the cross-complaints against the supplier.

It must be remembered, however, that this finding applied to one case only; 13 others were still pending, and additional defendants continued to be added on reflexive cross-complaints. For such suits, the "worse case scenario" is a discovery order stating that "a cross-complaint filed against one defendant is deemed against all defendants". Counsel must be aware of this situation and obtain a case management order fashioned such that someone cannot bring a new party into the lawsuit who has not previously been served with process.

While the appellate proceeding was still pending, counsel telephoned the numerous cross-complainants who had subsequently sued the client on indemnity cross-complaints in other consolidated blue water cases and requested voluntary dismissals. These calls were followed up by detailed letters factually discussing the lack of evidence placing the client’s products at the sites. Because the client supplied more than one product line, informal discovery needed to be completed to eliminate all lines being present at the subject sites. After those parties were made aware of the successful result of the writ petition, all voluntarily executed dismissals in the 13 remaining cases. Consequently, the supplier was not required to pay any settlement monies other than those paid, $50 per house, in the first case.

The analytical approach used to reach this successful result – the transactional costs paid and settlement monies paid were the lowest of any defendant in all 14 lawsuits – was to focus at the onset upon the factual basis for the client’s involvement in the litigation and its potential liability. Thereafter, meetings were held with the client to discuss strategy, tactics, and prospective transactional costs (meanwhile the defense was tendered to the manufacturers). The decision was made to avoid the reflexive litigation response to cross-complain against "old" and new parties and instead to settle directly with plaintiffs, moving for determination of good faith settlement, and securing the dismissal of all cross-actions thereafter in all other lawsuits.

None of these solutions are uniquely brilliant. The difficulty lies in crafting a separate plan and successfully implementing it amidst the tidal wave of mass litigation. Like a fish swimming upstream, counsel has to reanalyze his or her position at each step, be it at a discovery meeting or a court hearing, to see if the position taken by the "mass" of litigants – plaintiffs and defendants – is in line with the goal of counsel’s client.

  • Peripheral Party Perspective.

If a party wants to stay on the periphery of a case and get out quickly, its counsel must keep that goal in mind and be willing to take some calculated risks. The irony of being counsel for a peripheral player is that, while maintaining a low profile to keep costs down, counsel wants to be creative and aggressive in his or her efforts to get the client out of the case. For example, to minimize the cross-complaints against the client, do not begin by filing cross-complaints against anyone. If, as in the blue water cases, a special master is appointed or the judge raises the issue, sua sponte, actively discourage him or her from entering an order that a cross-complaint for indemnity against one is deemed to be a cross-complaint against all. Moreover, consider requesting a case management order which focuses on causation issues. To explain, in the blue water cases, counsel was aggressive in filing a motion to adopt a case management order – a toxic tort strategy applied to construction litigation. The proposed case management order, if adopted, would have brought with it the probable dismissal of numerous peripheral defendants. Thus, merely moving for the case management order assisted counsel in persuading certain cross-complainants to voluntarily dismiss the client prior to the hearing on the motion.

At the same time, counsel must perform an internal factual investigation to determine where the client’s products were used an in what amounts. In this way, it will be possible to put a dollar value on any potential settlement. The factual investigation will also enable counsel to assess the client’s role in the case and, correspondingly, the settlement options available.

Next, while conducting the investigation, counsel should avoid becoming involved in any administrative role that may make it more difficult to extricate the client from the case. For example, courts often appoint lead counsel and steering committees. Counsel should avoid assuming these roles. Along those lines, in order to limit costs and the client’s exposure, attend only mandatory appearances and defer retaining and designating any expert witnesses. If ordered to name experts by a specific date, counsel should attempt to share experts with other defendants similarly situated. Identify and attend only critical depositions and propound discovery requests only if informal attempts to obtain evidence against the client prove unsuccessful.

It is too easy to become overly conservative and to fall into the trap of propounding boilerplate discovery, attending every depositions, retaining and designating experts, etc. Instead, before taking any of those steps, ask "Do I really need to this; what is the worst that will happen if I do not do this, and is that really so bad?" Call the client to discuss creative approaches to the litigation, explaining the risks and the benefits of a suggested strategy. On securing the "green light", counsel should stay on the chosen path and not allow more traditional methods of litigation to steer him or her off course. In the end, counsel will have saved the client a lot of money in settlement dollars and transactional costs and both counsel and client will feel enriched because of counsel’s creative strategizing.

In a complex case where the distributor client is a very small player, it is a risk worth taking to go to trial without having retained any experts. Instead, make the cross-complainant seeking indemnity prove its causation case against the client. This is usually an uphill battle because the jury will know that the client did not make or install any product which could have caused the injury. The jurors will be concentrating on the primary target defendants that the plaintiff has chosen to sue and will be much less concerned with peripheral defendants brought in on cross-complaints.

  • Blue Water Meets Toxic Torts.

As discussed, supra, a middleman supplier in a mass litigation context has the option of settling directly with the plaintiffs to avoid the high transactional costs of lengthy, complex litigation. This same type of approach which was used in the foregoing "blue water" case paradigm has recently been used in the breast implant litigation. Although in that litigation the distributor was sued directly by the plaintiffs, nevertheless the defendant, like the construction client, was simply a middleman distributor. In the breast implant litigation, the distributor purchased a silicone gel product from Dow Corning and could have brought a cross-complaint for indemnification against that manufacturer. Instead, the distributor first approached Dow Corning to discuss settlement, but its overtures were rejected. Rather than accepting defeat, the distributor then initiated settlement discussions directly with the plaintiffs’ attorneys. Because of the national scope of the litigation, the decision to settle early, rather than engage in prolonged and costly litigation, no doubt staved off the bankruptcy that could have resulted had the distributor’s counsel followed the more traditional litigation route. The imaginative solution, creating a fund to compensate past and future breast implant claims, was attractive to plaintiffs who would have fared poorly had distributor filed for bankruptcy and who were thereby assigned the settling distributor’s rights to pursue indemnification from Dow Corning.

Not long ago, a similar approach was also used by a manufacturer of asbestos insulation in settling a number of asbestos-related personal injury and wrongful death claims. Plaintiffs and this manufacturer aligned themselves against the deep-pocket insurance carriers by the manufacturer assigning to plaintiffs "a piece of the action" against the carriers in its insurance coverage litigation. In exchange for plaintiffs’ dismissals of their claims against the manufacturer, the plaintiffs received settlement payments comprised partly of cash and partly of "paper IOU’s-bucks" which were assignments of the right to recover specified sums of money should the manufacturer prevail in the insurance coverage litigation. Ultimately, the carriers found it more cost effective to negotiate a settlement of the coverage issues than to continue to litigate.

It is essential to the peripheral player strategy that counsel always be mindful of where the client fits into the big picture of the case and should not hesitate to be creative and to carve out a niche for the client. As a general rule, plaintiffs’ attorneys will not settle with a party for a low price early in the litigation, unless the attorney is convinced that the settling defendant or cross-defendant is a peripheral player or that there is a subset of big players to whom plaintiff can look for major settlement monies. Timing of settlement as well as strategy are important. However, whether the case is a toxic tort case or construction defect case, it is creative thinking up front tied to long-term goals that can result in efficient and successful outcomes for the clients.