Texas Supreme Court Rules That No Constitutional Right to Play College Sports Exists
 
February 15, 2006
 
Heather Anne Calhoun - Atlanta

In National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Yeo, 171 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. 2005), the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the due process clause of the Texas Constitution does not protect the right to participate in intercollegiate athletics. Most notably, the Court reasoned that the nature of one’s interest in an athletic reputation is the same for all students, regardless of how well the student’s reputation stands.

Joscelin Yeo, a champion swimmer prior to enrolling in college, transferred from the University of California at Berkeley (Berkeley) where she swam competitively to the University of Texas at Austin (UT) before the fall of 2000. Because both Berkeley and UT were members of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), UT had to restrict Yeo from participating in intercollegiate athletic competitions for one full academic year. Yeo did not enroll in classes in the fall semester of 2000, and she sat out on all athletic competitions the following semester when she enrolled in classes. UT mistakenly believed that Yeo had sat out a full academic year and began letting her compete in the fall of 2001. Berkeley complained, and Yeo was forced to sit out for the rest of the semester plus several regularly scheduled events in the following semester to make up for the mistake.

Yeo sued UT, and in November 2002, the trial court rendered judgment for Yeo, declaring that her procedural due process rights were violated and permanently enjoining UT-Austin from declaring Yeo ineligible in the future without affording her due process. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Texas Supreme Court focused on its previous decision, in Spring Branch Independent School District v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1985), in coming to its decision. Yeo argued that although Stamos held that a student has no legal right to participate in extracurricular activities, her situation was different because she had a unique reputation and earning potential in the activity. Yeo argued that the degree of her interest in her athletic reputation, and not just its character, brought her within constitutional protection. She pointed out that she previously established a stellar reputation as a world-class athlete before coming to college that was independent from her intercollegiate swimming career.

The Texas Supreme Court disagreed with Yeo that the weight of an interest determines its nature. As the United States Supreme Court held in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the question of whether an interest is protected by due process depends on its nature, not its weight. The Texas Supreme Court found no measure for distinguishing the differences in cases, and determined that the nature of one’s interest in his or her reputation is the same no matter how good the reputation stands. As a result, the Court held that Yeo had no constitutionally protected interest in playing intercollegiate sports.

The Texas Supreme Court further distinguished its holding in University of Texas Medical School v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1995) that protected a student’s interest in a graduate school education, holding that Yeo’s claims for lost opportunities in the intercollegiate athletics arena were too speculative for due process protection. The Court reasoned that student-athletes hold only mere expectations, rather than legal entitlement, for future financial opportunities. As such, the Texas Supreme Court overruled the court of appeals decision and ruled that Yeo take nothing.

The decision in Yeo emphasizes to educators the distinction between extracurricular activities, like intercollegiate athletics, and other educational opportunities, such as obtaining graduate degrees. Further, educators should note that when students assert reputation as the protected interest, the weight of the reputation should not affect the protection afforded by due process.

For more information, e-mail Heather A. Calhoun at heather.calhoun@hklaw.com or call toll free, 1-888-688-8500.