Recent Federal District Court Decisions Illustrate the Caution Employers Must Exercise in Accommodating Their Employees’ Religious Beliefs and Practices
July 19, 2007
Jonathan E. "Jon" O'Connell- Northern Virginia
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating against employees and job applicants on the basis of religion, and requires employers to make accommodations for their employees’ religious beliefs and practices, unless making such accommodations would result in an “undue hardship” to the employer. Although Title VII claims based on religious beliefs and practices are relatively rare compared to claims based on race, sex and national origin, two recent federal district court decisions illustrate the liability exposure employers can face from religion-related claims.
Krop v. Nicholson
In Krop v. Nicholson, Lynne Krop, an observant Jew, sued her former employer, a Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center, alleging religious discrimination in violation of Title VII. During her employment, Krop, a clinical pharmacist, requested and was granted leave without pay (LWOP) to prepare meals necessary to celebrate various Jewish Holy Days, including Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah. However, a new supervisor told Krop that she was using too much LWOP and that in the future, she would have to use her accrued annual leave for time off for the Jewish Holy Days.
When Krop subsequently asked to use LWOP to prepare for and celebrate Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, she had only two hours of accrued annual leave. Her supervisor agreed to grant her LWOP for the balance of Rosh Hashanah not covered by her accrued leave. He refused, however, to approve Krop’s LWOP request for Yom Kippur based on his assertion that Yom Kippur did not begin until sundown. In response, Krop resigned.
Krop sued, claiming the Department failed to accommodate the practice of her religious beliefs by denying her the use of LWOP to observe Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah. The court ruled that she was entitled to a trial and denied the employer’s motion to dismiss Krop’s claims. “Title VII imposes a duty on employers to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious observance or practice, unless the accommodation would cause an undue hardship on the employer’s business,” the court stated. The employer’s argument that allowing Krop to use annual leave was a reasonable accommodation and its claim that allowing Krop to take LWOP would be an undue hardship were without merit. “By requiring Plaintiff to use annual leave for religious holidays, Defendant, in essence, offered an accommodation that could be found by the jury to have discriminated against Plaintiff by negatively affecting a benefit of employment enjoyed by other employees who did not share the same religious beliefs as Plaintiff, i.e. vacation time.” And it was a jury’s duty to determine whether granting Krop LWOP would cause the employer an undue hardship, the court ruled.
Sistrunk v. Camden County Workforce Investment Board
In Sistrunk v. Camden County Workforce Investment Board, plaintiff Dennis Sistrunk sued his former employer, alleging that it had failed to accommodate his Rastafarian religious beliefs by terminating his employment after he refused to cut his dreadlocks. Sistrunk was employed to recruit troubled youths into the workforce programs run by the Workforce Investment Board (WIB) and to serve as a liaison between the judicial system and the WIB. His position required him to have significant contact with judges, prosecutors, parole officers and parents. Sistrunk had received WIB’s employee handbook, which required employees to present a professional appearance, prohibited “radical departure from conventional professional dress or personal grooming” and “excessively long hair” for males, and stated that employees who failed to report for work or call in for three days would be terminated.
Sistrunk received counseling from several WIB staff members regarding the need to be more professional with respect to his hair and clothing. Sistrunk contended that a supervisor “explicitly” told him to either cut his hair or not return to work and that he told the supervisor that cutting his hair would disrupt his way of life. Sistrunk then stayed away from work for three days without calling in, claiming he was waiting to see if the employer would withdraw the demand that he cut his hair. As a result of the absences he was terminated. Sistrunk wrote WIB, explaining that he failed to report to work due to the ultimatum regarding his hair, and subsequently sued for religious discrimination under Title VII and New Jersey law.
The WIB asked the court to dismiss Sistrunk’s lawsuit, claiming that it had no idea Sistrunk wore the dreadlocks for religious reasons. The court agreed that notice of the employee’s religious beliefs is necessary to a religious accommodation claim, but that Sistrunk had satisfied that notice requirement. “[A]lthough Plaintiff does not contend that he explicitly informed the staff members present at this meeting that he could not comply with this requirement due to his religious beliefs, Plaintiff has set forth sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that only a jury could decide.” As a result, Sistrunk was entitled to a jury trial, the court ruled.
Religious Beliefs and Practices: What Is Protected
Krop and Sistrunk illustrate the caution employers must exercise in making employment decisions when employee religious beliefs and practices may be implicated. Employers should take steps to ensure that managers are aware of the protections provided to employee religious beliefs and practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Such training should emphasize that all religious faiths, regardless of how widely practiced they may be, are protected under Title VII.
For more information, email Jonathan E. O’Connell at jonathan.oconnell@hklaw.com or call toll free, 1-888-688-8500.