Religious Institutions Update: May 2026

Key Cases

Employment Discrimination

Christian Ministry May Decline to Hire Non-Ministerial Employees Who Do Not Share Its Religious Beliefs

In Union Gospel Mission of Yakima Wash. v. Brown, 162 F. 4th 1190 (9th Cir. 2026), the court of appeals considered a pre-enforcement action seeking a declaration that it violates the church autonomy doctrine to enforce the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) so as to prohibit a faith-based homeless shelter from hiring non-ministerial employees such as an IT technician or operations assistant on terms consistent with its beliefs. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's conclusion that the ministry was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim. The plaintiff also operates a faith-based recovery program, health clinic and provides meal services. "It encourages everyone that it helps to 'develop a relationship with Jesus Christ.'" The plaintiff requires its employees to agree with and live out its Christian beliefs and practices, including "abstaining from any sexual conduct outside of biblical marriage between one man and one woman." The court ruled, "[b]ecause who a religious organization hires may go to the very character of its religious mission, the church autonomy doctrine protects the decision to hire co-religionists for non-ministerial roles if that decision is based on the organization's sincerely held religious beliefs." The church autonomy doctrine encompasses more than just the ministerial exception. As long as a religious ministry believes that its non-ministerial employees must adhere to and live according to its religious principles to accomplish its religious mission, "the only way a court could adjudicate a dispute for a plaintiff would be to rule that the religious institution cannot seek that 'mission' or that the hiring policy isn't necessary to that 'mission' – inherently religious questions." The court made a point to say that its ruling was limited to religious ministries such as the plaintiff and does not extend to commercial businesses or hospitals.

Free Exercise

School District May Refuse to Purchase Sectarian Curricular Materials for Charter School

In Woolard v. Thurmond, 170 F. 4th 701 (9th Cir. 2026), parents and guardians of students enrolled in independent study programs at two California charter schools sued the school district and school officials, alleging that the rejection of their requests to purchase and use sectarian curricular materials for instruction in the independent study programs violates the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The district court dismissed their claims and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals determined that the content of the curricular instruction was government speech.

Antidiscrimination Law Enforceable Against Spa's "Biological Women Only" Entrance Policy

In Olympus SPA v. Armstrong, 169 F. 4th 817 (9th Cir. 2026), the court of appeals dismissed the free exercise, free speech and free association claims of a Korean health spa that had a "biological women only" entrance policy in violation of WLAD. The court treated WLAD as a neutral law of general applicability subject to only rational basis review under the Free Exercise Clause with only an incidental burden on the spa's religious expression. The court ruled that WLAD imposes an incidental restriction no greater than is essential to eliminate discriminatory conduct and does not impermissibly burden the spa's free speech. Last, the court decided that the spa is not an intimate association in the First Amendment sense because its customers and employees do not share "deep attachments and commitments" and is not an expressive association.

Grant Nondiscrimination Certification Requirement Interfered with Ministry's Expressive Association as to Non-Funded Operations

In Youth 71Five Ministries v. Williams, 160 F. 4th 964 (9th Cir. 2025), the court of appeals considered a Christian ministry's free exercise, religious autonomy and expressive association challenge to an agency rule requiring every grant applicant to certify that it did not discriminate in its employment practices with regard to, inter alia, religion. The goal of the competitive grant program is to fund community organizations that serve at-risk youth to prevent crime and reduce high risk behaviors. The plaintiff offers youth programs that "provide social interaction, vocational training, and meaningful relationships, all while emphasizing the importance of having a relationship with Jesus Christ." The plaintiff was a grant recipient until the imposition of the grant condition. The district court denied the ministry's motion for preliminary injunction and granted state officials' motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The court of appeals affirmed the latter but reversed the former, ruling that the ministry was likely to succeed with its claim that the rule infringes its expressive association to the extent it interferes with the ministry's conduct outside the scope of the funded program. As applied to the funded program, the court viewed the rule as viewpoint neutral, affecting religious and nonreligious programs. Although the rule has the effect of enabling religious grantees to be funded who do not require hiring only co-religionists, this "is not due to any 'explicit [or] deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations.'" The court of appeals also agreed with the district court that the ministry was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its free exercise or ecclesiastical abstention and ministerial exception claims. According to the court, these are affirmative defenses, not rights that can be wielded against a state agency.

Nonprofit Advocacy Corporation Has Free Exercise Rights

In Oregon Right to Life v. Stolfi, 158 F. 4th 1013 (9th Cir. 2025), the court determined that the decisive question when determining whether the right to free exercise of religion extends to a corporation, regardless whether the corporation is closely-held, is whether those in control have shared religious beliefs that are recognized and promulgated through the corporation. The plaintiff Oregon Right to Life is a nonprofit, federal tax-exempt education and advocacy organization. The court of appeals decided that it "cannot ignore the self-proclaimed religious foundation" of the plaintiff as reflected in the Judeo-Christian Operation Clause contained in its articles of incorporation and the beliefs of board members. The court of appeals reversed the district court's order dismissing the plaintiff's complaint, vacated its order denying a preliminary injunction, and remanded the action to the district court for further proceedings on the plaintiff's claim that the requirement of Oregon's Reproductive Health Equity Act that the employer's health benefit plan provide abortion and contraceptive insurance coverage violates the plaintiff's free exercise rights.

3 Mandatory Vaccination Policies Survive Free Exercise Challenges

In Kondilis v. City of Chicago, 160 F. 4th 866 (7th Cir. 2025), the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the claims of current and former city employees that the city's COVID-19 vaccination policy, requiring employees to input their vaccination status into a database and enter COVID-19 testing results, violated Title VII and their free exercise, equal protection and Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) rights. Plaintiffs failed to elaborate on how the reporting requirements burdened their free exercise of religion. In any event, the requirements were neutral and generally applicable.

In Brox v. Woods Hole, 164 F. 4th 37 (1st Cir. 2026), the court of appeals affirmed denial of the motion for preliminary injunction of public ferry authority employees who alleged that denial of their requests for religious exemptions to the authority's COVID-19 vaccination mandate violated their free exercise, due process and certain state legal rights. The parties agreed that the policy was neutral with respect to religion. The court found the appellants waived their argument that the policy provided a mechanism for individualized exemptions. Moreover, the court rejected their argument that the policy is not generally applicable by virtue of incorporating a medical exemption that the court deemed incomparable. This left the policy subject to rational basis review, which it survived.

In Perry v. Marteney, No. 24-2132, 2026 WL 946152 (4th Cir. April 8, 2026), the court of appeals reversed the district court's grant of preliminary relief to a student's parents who sued on behalf of themselves and the student against the public school's learning coordinator, alleging that West Virginia's compulsory vaccination law violated their First Amendment right to freely exercise their Christian faith. The court of appeals disagreed with the district court that the vaccination mandate is not generally applicable because it allows for medical exemptions. The court viewed this exemption as incomparable to "conscientious exemptions of all stripes," including a religious exemption. The court also ruled that the rights of parents to direct the upbringing of their children were limited in the case of the threat of communicable disease.

Free Exercise Requires Curricular Opt-Outs

In Alan v. Lexington Pub. Schs., 814 F. Supp. 3d 61 (D. Mass 2025), the court ruled that a kindergarten student's father was likely to succeed on the merits of his claim on behalf of himself and his student that the failure to provide him with advance notice and an opportunity to opt the student out of classroom instruction involving LGBTQ+ issues in conflict with his religious beliefs violated the free exercise clause.

Church Autonomy

Church Autonomy and Ministerial Exception Doctrine Precluded Director's Tort Claims

In McRaney v. N. Am. Mission Bd. of the S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 157 F. 4th 627 (5th Cir. 2025), the court of appeals ruled that the church autonomy and ministerial exception doctrine barred the tortious interference, defamation and emotional distress claims of the former executive director of the North American Mission Board (NAMB) of the Southern Baptist Convention against his former employer and other religious organizations' decisions not to hire him or to disinvite him from speaking engagements. The court of appeals ruled that the doctrine is triggered by the subject matter of the dispute, not the organizational (e.g., hierarchical or nonhierarchical) structure of the disputants. "[T]he decision how to structure a religious institution is itself a religious decision." The court noted one line of authority treating the church autonomy doctrine as an affirmative defense and another as jurisdictional. The court of appeals decided that one way to reconcile this is to say that some parts of the doctrine are jurisdictional such as ecclesiastical questions, and other parts are nonjurisdictional such as the ministerial exception doctrine. Concerning the former, the court of appeals decided that the church autonomy doctrine is jurisdictional in three senses: 1) matters falling within its ambit are beyond the power and cognizance of civil courts, 2) it rests on structural, constitutional limitations in the First Amendment and 3) breaches of it impose irreparable injuries on religious organizations that require immediate appellate review. Equally, the court of appeals decided that it is not jurisdictional "in the narrow Rule 12(b)(1) sense." A court that grants a Rule 12(b)(1) motion leaves the plaintiff free to refile elsewhere, whereas the church autonomy doctrine does not preclude federal courts from rendering judgment on the merits as in this case so as to prevent courts from opining on "matters of faith and doctrine" and intruding into NAMB's "internal management decisions that are essential to [its] central mission."

Ministerial Exception Doctrine Barred Chaplain's Claim Against Religious Hospital

In Davenport v. Episcopal Health Servs., Inc., No. 24-CV-8821 (HG) (CHK), 2026 WL 309533 (E.D. N.Y. Feb. 5, 2026), the district court, sua sponte, requested briefing on the application of the ministerial exception doctrine to a chaplain's claim against an Episcopal hospital for violations of Title IX, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York law, alleging that he was not paid for spiritual and clinical counseling that he performed for patients after his shift ended, and that the hospital improperly rejected his sexual harassment claim but suspended him when the claim was made against him. The plaintiff argued that the hospital is secular, but the court decided otherwise that its operator originated from an established church, the operator was part of the Episcopal Diocese of Long Island, the hospital and operator held themselves out to the public as "Episcopal," and the hospital's clinical pastoral program was religious. The court determined that the chaplain qualified as a minister and the ministerial exception doctrine barred his claims.

Members' Suit Claiming Breach of Bylaws Involves Neutral Principles

In Singh v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., No. 990620, 2026 WL 903225 (Nev. April 2, 2026), members of a religious organization, the Northern Nevada Sikh Society, sued its management asserting breach of bylaws claims and seeking declaratory relief, alleging that management improperly created committees to transfer temple property into a trust without member approval, failed to maintain membership records, and refused to allow inspection of books and records. The court determined that the dispute involved neutral issues not subject to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. The court decided that it could decide the dispute without reference to any ecclesiastical controversy, doctrines, practices or texts simply by evaluating whether management acted in accordance with the organization's bylaws

RFRA

Public Park Development Plan Not a Violation of Texas RFRA or Constitutional Provisions

In Perez v. City of San Antonio, 163 F. 4th 110 (5th Cir. 2025), the court of appeals ruled that members of a Native American church were unlikely to prevail on the merits of their claim that San Antonio's development plan for a park, including its tree removal and rookery management procedures, substantially burdened their sincere religious practices in violation of the Texas RFRA, Free Exercise Clause, and Freedom to Worship Clause and Texas Religious Services Clause of the Texas Constitution. The church believes that a 25-foot-by-30-foot area of the 343-acre park is sacred. The church sought a preliminary injunction ensuring access for religious services, preservation of the "spiritual ecology" of the area by minimizing tree removal and allowing cormorants to nest there. The court of appeals agreed that the church's request for access was moot because the city removed fencing, the city's plan was crucial to disease risk mitigation, tree removal was necessary to repair crumbling retaining walls and to protect visitors from danger of falling branches, and the city's plans were the least restrictive means to achieve its interest in ensuring visitor safety. The court of appeals certified a question regarding the scope of the Texas Religious Services Clause. The Supreme Court of Texas answered that question as follows: "When the Texas Religious Services Clause applies, its force is absolute and categorical, meaning it forbids governmental prohibitions and limitations on religious services regardless of the government's interest in that limitation or how tailored the limitation is to that interest, but the scope of the clause's applicability is not unlimited, and it does not extend to governmental actions for the preservation and management of public lands."

Free Speech

Colorado Conversion Therapy Law Unconstitutional

In Chiles v. Salazar, 146 S.Ct. 1010 (2026), the U,S. Supreme Court reviewed a Colorado law prohibiting licensed counselors from engaging in "conversion therapy" with minors, defined to include "any practice or treatment … that attempts … to change an individual's sexual orientation or gender identity," as well as any "effort[t] to change behaviors or gender expressions or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attractions toward individuals of the same sex." The law allows counselors to provide "[a]cceptance, support and understanding for … identity exploration and development" and to assist persons "undergoing gender transition." The lower courts ruled that the law is best understood as regulating professional conduct and speech only incidentally, thus triggering only rational basis review. The Supreme Court disagreed and ruled that the law unconstitutionally regulates speech based on viewpoint, triggering strict scrutiny review. The plaintiff engages only in "talk therapy." Whereas the lower courts determined that the law regulates conduct, the Supreme Court ruled that it regulates only the plaintiff's speech. She argued that the law permits her to speak in ways that encourage a client undergoing gender transition but prohibits her from speaking in ways that help a client realign his identity with his sex. The law allows her to affirm a client's sexual orientation but prohibits her from speaking in a way that helps a client "change" his sexual attractions or behaviors. The Supreme Court emphasized the First Amendment protects licensed professionals as much as anyone else. Her speech does not become conduct because the state calls it that or because her speech can also be described as a "treatment" or "therapeutic modality." Although the state has traditionally licensed the practice of medicine, those laws have traditionally addressed an individual's qualifications. The Court concluded: "[T]he First Amendment stands as a shield against any effort to enforce orthodoxy in thought or speech in this country. It reflects instead a judgment that every American possesses an inalienable right to think and speak freely, and a faith in the free marketplace of ideas as the best means for discovering truth."

Michigan Conversion Therapy Law Also Unconstitutional

In Catholic Charities of Jackson, Lenawee and Hillsdale Counties v. Whitmer, 162 F. 4th 686 (6th Cir. 2025), the court of appeals reached a conclusion similar to the Supreme Court in Chiles v. Salazar concerning Michigan's conversion therapy law. Under the Michigan law, therapists are free to offer their minor clients "counseling that provides assistance to an individual undergoing a gender transition," but if a minor client (with his parents' consent) seeks counseling to "change" his "behavior or gender expression" to align with his biological sex, his therapist can lose her license if she provides it. As in Chiles v. Salazar, the plaintiff therapists, who offer counseling services grounded in their Catholic faith, engage in talk therapy. The court ruled that the law may be unconstitutional per se as a viewpoint-based speech limitation.

Parental Rights

Massachusetts May Require Students with Disabilities Attending Private Schools to Receive Services at a Public School or Neutral Location

In Hellman v. Mass. Dep't of Elem. and Sec. Educ., 171 F. 4th 69 (1st Cir. 2026), parents of students with disabilities enrolled in private schools challenged a regulation requiring special education services for private school students to be provided only at public schools or neutral locations as in violation of due process and equal protection by virtue of violating their fundamental parental rights and violation of the Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed their claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals determined that the complaint alleged, at most, an increased logistical burden: Privately enrolled students must receive publicly funded services at a neutral or public location rather than on the private school campus. According to the court, the rule is a reasonable means of advancing Massachusetts's legitimate interest in extending special education services to all students while complying with the state constitution's prohibition on the state providing direct aid to private schools. The state Blaine or no-aid clause states, "No grant, appropriation or use of public money … shall be made or authorized by the Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof for the purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any … primary or secondary school … which is not publicly owned." Furthermore, the court decided that the rule does not violate the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act or the Massachusetts special education requirement that students with disabilities be educated in the "least restrictive environment." Nor do the allegations allege a violation of the rights of national citizenship as required to state a claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.

"Don't Tell" Policy and Mandated Pronoun Policy Violate Parents' and Teachers' Rights

In Mirabelli v. Olson, No. 3:23-cv-768-BEN-WVG, 2025 WL 3713588 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2026), the court ruled that parents were likely to succeed on their claim that the state's policies preventing schools from telling parents about students' efforts to engage in gender transitioning at school unless the student consents to parental notification, as well as requiring schools to use students' self-identified names and pronouns regardless of their parents' wishes, violate the parents' free exercise and substantive due process rights. Moreover, public school teachers were likely to succeed on their claim that compelling them to participate in the state's policies violated their free exercise rights.

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