November 18, 2026

Let's Make a Deal: What Federal Prosecutors Want When Your Client Is Looking to Cooperate

Part 1: Cooperation Preindictment
Holland & Knight Enforcement in Focus Blog
Cal Albritton
Enforcement In Focus Blog

Editors' Note: Before joining Holland & Knight, Cal spent almost 10 years at the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Florida in the Criminal Division and Civil Division.

Prosecutors typically want three things when offering cooperation credit to clients who find themselves looking for a deal: 1) evidence they don't know about or cannot easily discover on their own, 2) the identities of other wrongdoers and responsible parties and 3) the information provided early enough to help or expand their case.

Once your client makes the decision to cooperate, those who act quickly and provide full information truthfully are best positioned to earn meaningful credit. Like any deal, cooperation is a negotiation: The client's leverage is the value of what he or she can offer, and that leverage is greatest before anyone else comes forward. Counsel's goal in advocating for the client is to avoid a felony charge altogether, which requires in-depth knowledge of how prosecutors evaluate cooperation to ideally negotiate a non-prosecution agreement (NPA), declination, pretrial diversion or misdemeanor plea.

Consider an example: A midlevel employee at a company under investigation for fraud who helped carry out a scheme directed by the company's executives. The employee did not design the scheme or profit significantly from it but knows how it worked and who was behind it. What can that employee offer U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutors, and what can counsel realistically negotiate in return? How can counsel help the client secure a nonfelony outcome?

Why a Nonfelony Outcome Matters

A felony conviction follows a client long after a sentence is served. A felony can strip away rights such as the right to vote, serve on a jury, hold public office or possess a firearm. The employment consequences can be just as severe. Routine background checks will unearth felony convictions, and a felony can disqualify a client from professional licenses (law, medicine, securities, insurance or real estate) and security clearances.

The goal of any cooperation deal should be to avoid the felony conviction for the client.

The Starting Point: The DOJ's Default Position

Before negotiating, counsel should understand where prosecutors begin. The prosecutor ordinarily charges "the most serious offense that is encompassed by the defendant's conduct and that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction." Justice Manual § 9-27.300. Prosecutors often refer to this as charging "the most serious readily provable offense."

Willingness to cooperate is a factor in a charging decision but generally "should not by itself relieve a person of criminal liability." Id. § 9-27.230. The DOJ's stated policy is that an offender "be required to incur at least some liability for his/her criminal conduct." Id. § 9-27.600. A guilty plea paired with a substantial assistance motion1 is "the preferred method" for securing cooperation, and the DOJ treats an agreement not to prosecute as an exception to the norm. Id.

The DOJ also has a trial-driven reason. A cooperator who appears to be getting off consequence-free may be less credible on the witness stand than one who has been convicted. Any request for a nonfelony outcome has to contend with these default positions.

The Legal Framework: What Prosecutors Have in Mind

At sentencing, Section 5K1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines authorizes a sentence reduction for "substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person." Although defense counsel's goal is never to reach sentencing in the first place, prosecutors are generally evaluating the quality and helpfulness of a client's cooperation with this standard in mind.

The substantial assistance that prosecutors are looking for is concrete results: information that leads to the seizure of evidence or arrest of another person, testimony in legal proceedings or that causes someone else to plead guilty. Simply providing truthful information that leads nowhere will not earn any cooperation credit.

The Path to a Proffer: Evaluate, Attorney Proffer Then Client Proffer

If cooperation appears to be in the client's interest, counsel can make an attorney proffer – a meeting with prosecutors, without the client present, where counsel previews the information and assistance the client could provide. The attorney proffer lets the government gauge the value of the cooperation without exposing the client to the risks of a face-to-face interview. If the government sees value, counsel can then negotiate the framework of a potential deal, including whether a nonfelony resolution is on the table, and schedule an in-person proffer interview.

The client proffer is governed by a proffer agreement that sets ground rules for the meeting between the client and prosecutors. The proffer letter typically provides that statements made during the meeting cannot be used in the government's case-in-chief but otherwise makes no promises about the outcome.

Once the client sits down for a proffer, he or she must tell the truth. Prosecutors view cooperation as "you're in or you're out." If the prosecutor catches the client in a lie or half-truth, the client's credibility as a witness will be torpedoed. Lies that surface later may tank any chance at a nonfelony resolution, even if the information was otherwise helpful. And of course, the government cannot build investigations off a cooperator's proffer if the cooperator does not give truthful information in the first place.

Be First: Timeliness Matters

Cooperation is not helpful to the DOJ if someone else provides the same information first, the government already knows the information, or law enforcement has already made an arrest or obtained the evidence without the cooperator's help. The Justice Manual makes the same point, instructing prosecutors weighing a NPA to ask whether "substantially the same benefit can be obtained from someone else without an agreement not to prosecute." Justice Manual § 9-27.620. The first cooperator through the door with unique and valuable information has the most leverage to negotiate.

What Prosecutors May Ask Your Client to Do

As part of a client's cooperation, prosecutors may ask your client to do more than just provide information. For full credit, expect requests for assistance that law enforcement cannot do on its own:

  • access documents, phones and emails
  • testify before a grand jury
  • permit a location to be wired for sound or video
  • wear a wire or video camera to a meeting
  • make monitored calls to co-conspirators
  • purchase contraband
  • testify at trial

Recall the midlevel employee mentioned above. Successful, valuable cooperation might look like the following: The employee might walk agents through how the scheme worked, identify the documents, accounts and emails that prove it, make recorded calls to the company's CEO to help agents gather evidence and later testify before the grand jury or at trial. Each of these steps gives prosecutors evidence they could not easily obtain on their own, strengthening the case for a nonfelony resolution.

Making the Case for a Nonfelony Resolution

Counsel should frame the client's cooperation around what prosecutors value: information that is significant and not otherwise available, identifies other wrongdoers, arrives early enough to shape the investigation and comes from a credible, fully committed cooperator.

Counsel should also emphasize mitigating facts, such as the client's limited role, lack of criminal history and acceptance of responsibility, and explain why the direct and collateral consequences of a felony would be disproportionate. Counsel should raise the desired resolution early, ideally during the attorney proffer and framework negotiations, rather than after the client has already provided everything of value.

Two main options are available to recognize and reward preindictment cooperation: an agreement not to prosecute, including pretrial diversion, or a plea to a reduced charge such as a misdemeanor.

Path One: Declination, Non-Prosecution Agreements and Pretrial Diversion

An indictment is not automatic. Even when the evidence is sufficient, a prosecutor should decline if the case serves no substantial federal interest or an adequate noncriminal alternative, such as pretrial diversion, exists. Justice Manual §§ 9-27.220, 9-27.250. Prosecutors do acknowledge cases "in which the value of a person's cooperation clearly outweighs the federal interest in prosecuting him/her." Id. § 9-27.230.

First, counsel may persuade the government simply to decline prosecution. A presentation that highlights the client's minor role, lack of culpability, lack of criminal history and unique personal circumstances can be persuasive. Id. § 9-27.230. For the employee in our example, a subordinate role and limited personal gain are the facts to drive home. A declination is simply that – a decision not to prosecute. Unlike a NPA, it gives the client no binding protection if the government later changes its mind.

Counsel may also seek a formal NPA, but it's generally a last resort for prosecutors. A prosecutor may enter into one in exchange for cooperation, with supervisory approval, only when the person's timely cooperation appears necessary to the public interest and other means of obtaining it are unavailable or would not be effective. Id. § 9-27.600. Defense counsel must be prepared to explain why alternatives such as a substantial assistance motion after a guilty plea will not work, for example, because delay would compromise the investigation.

In deciding whether cooperation is necessary to the public interest, prosecutors weigh the importance of the case, the value of the cooperation, the person's relative culpability and criminal history, and the interests of any victims. Id. § 9-27.620. Culpability matters. In our company employee example, prosecutors may agree not to prosecute the employee to build a case against the CEO, but they would rarely forgo prosecuting the CEO at the head of the scheme to obtain evidence against a subordinate. Victim interests, including whether restitution has already been made, can strengthen a client's position.

Any NPA will likely be narrow. Prosecutors generally avoid "blanket" immunity, limiting agreements to non-prosecution based on the information provided or to a specific known offense, and conditioning the agreement on complete and truthful cooperation. Id. § 9-27.630. Counsel who anticipates these limits can negotiate the scope of the agreement at the framework stage before the client proffers.

Path Two: Bargaining for a Misdemeanor to Give the Prosecutor a Win and Preserve Trial Credibility

When a prosecutor is reluctant to decline prosecution or enter into an NPA, a misdemeanor plea may often be a realistic nonfelony outcome. A misdemeanor conviction is not ideal but carries far fewer restrictions on civil rights and imposes fewer employment hurdles in the future.

Prosecutors may recognize reducing charges "in number or degree" in return for cooperation and a guilty plea. Id. § 9-27.600. A misdemeanor plea satisfies the DOJ's policy that an offender incurs "at least some liability," and it answers the trial credibility concern that a cooperator who gets off "scot-free" makes a weaker witness in front of a jury. Id. It also gives the prosecutor a criminal conviction and public record of accountability. Framing the request this way, giving the government an immediate, tangible result may be more persuasive than asking for a NPA. If the employee in our example will testify against the CEO at trial, a misdemeanor plea lets the government present a witness who has accepted responsibility while sparing the employee a felony record.

Counsel should also anticipate the government's concerns. Prosecutors are told to approach cooperation-based charge reductions "cautiously," because a cooperator who pleads to an offense "that appears unrelated in seriousness or scope" to the charges against the defendants on trial may be impeached, and the public record must still reflect "the full extent of the defendant's involvement." Id. § 9-27.430. A willingness to accept a factual statement in a plea agreement that candidly describes the client's conduct can ease those concerns and make it easier for the prosecutor to say yes.

The Role of Defense Counsel

In the end, cooperation is a deal like any other. Skilled defense advocacy and negotiation with prosecutors is crucial to ensure the client receives the most credit for his or her cooperation in the deal. A key element for any defense counsel operating in negotiating with the government is their own credibility, in addition to the credibility of their cooperating client. A defense counsel's ability to maintain trust and credibility with prosecutors will facilitate candid communication and help the government recognize the value of the client's assistance. A prosecutor who trusts defense counsel is more likely to credit the client's efforts and agree to a nonfelony resolution. Because the government controls both the charging decision and the decision not to charge, a defense counsel's front-end work to demonstrate the value of the client's timely, important information and assistance ensures that the government's decision reflects the full scope of the cooperation.

1 Substantial assistance motions at sentencing will be discussed in Part 2 of this series.

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