What the SCOTUS Ruling in Cox. v. Sony Means for Tech Providers and Copyright Owners

On March 25, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in Cox Communications, Inc. et al. v. Sony Music Entertainment et al. (No. 24‑171), reversing a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decision that Cox, an internet service provider (ISP), bore contributory liability for infringement committed by users of its services. The Court stated:

[A] company is not liable as a copyright infringer for merely providing a service to the general public with knowledge that it will be used by some to infringe copyrights.

Rather, service providers' contributory liability turns on whether they intend their services to be used for infringement. That intent may be established in just two ways: 1) inducing infringement, i.e., actively encouraging infringement through specific acts, or 2) tailoring to infringement, i.e., offering a service "not capable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses."

After examining what Cox did and did not do, the Court concluded that Cox neither induced nor tailored its internet service to facilitate infringement. First, Cox affirmatively discouraged infringing activity through contractual terms with subscribers and by issuing warnings, service suspensions and account terminations for certain repeat offenders (albeit not all of them). Second, Cox did not advertise, market or promote its services as tools for piracy.

Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the Court, rejected Sony's argument that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe harbor, which shields ISPs from secondary liability for their users' infringing activity under certain circumstances, would have no effect if ISPs were not liable for providing services to known infringers. Thomas wrote that the DMCA does not create liability where none would otherwise exist, it "merely creates new defenses from liability" for qualifying providers.¹ In other words, the DMCA safe harbor is a shield, not a sword.

Context and Significance

This case represents the high court's latest effort to grapple with secondary copyright liability in the face of emerging technology. The so-called "Betamax case" of Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios (1984)² held that a provider's actions (selling VCRs with knowledge that they might be used for infringement) did not demonstrate the requisite intent for contributory infringement where the devices were "capable of substantial noninfringing uses."

In contrast, MGM Studios v. Grokster (2005)³ held that the provider's actions (conducting marketing targeted to known infringers, failing to implement filtering tools and building a business model dependent on infringing activity) showed intent to encourage the infringing conduct, giving rise to potential liability.

Cox is the first time the Supreme Court has addressed whether an ISP's actions reflected the intent necessary to establish contributory copyright liability.

Limitations of the Majority's Decision

A Narrow Holding Focused on Intent

The holding is narrow in two respects. First, it concerns only contributory liability, not vicarious liability.⁴ It does not directly address any other doctrine of secondary copyright liability, nor does the decision address direct liability; it applies only to defendants who, like Cox, do not allegedly copy, host, distribute or publish infringing material themselves.

Second, it is limited to the facts of this case. The Court held that in the context of Cox's overall activities and nature of the services it provided, the ISP's failure to terminate all known infringers alone did not establish the requisite intent for contributory copyright liability. That does not mean, however, that knowingly providing service to repeat infringers could never support a finding of intent sufficient to establish contributory liability.

A Strong Concurrence Highlighted Concerns About Impact on the DMCA

Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, concurred in the judgment while disagreeing with the rationale. Justice Sotomayor's disagreement revolved around the majority's statement that contributory and vicarious liability are the only "two categories of secondary copyright liability" that the Court has "recognized." According to the concurring opinion, the majority "needlessly curtail[ed]" the scope of secondary liability, cutting off other common‑law theories of secondary liability, such as aiding and abetting, that historically required only knowledge of wrongdoing plus substantial assistance.

Justice Sotomayor further argued that even though the majority opinion does not purport to alter the DMCA, by narrowing the scope of secondary infringement, it has upset the incentive structure set up by the DMCA, removing any meaningful incentive for service providers to implement robust anti-infringement policies for purposes of gaining DMCA safe harbor protection.

Takeaways and Potential Implications

This ruling could have practical implications for a wide range of technology providers, artificial intelligence (AI) developers and copyright owners across a variety of digital media platforms and technologies.

1. General‑Purpose Tools May Not Be Inherently Risky: The Court's analysis emphasized that contributory infringement requires more than supplying a given tool with the knowledge that it can be misused. This may presage how courts will treat AI models, cloud platforms and content‑sharing services that offer general-purpose, broadly lawful functionality.
2. Responsible Governance Still Matters: Cox's warnings and enforcement actions helped demonstrate a lack of infringing intent. This underscores the value of robust acceptable‑use policies, notice‑handling systems and corrective measures for technology providers – even if those measures fall short of preventing all anticipated repeat infringement.
3. Product Design and Messaging Should Avoid "Inducement" Signals: The Court noted at length that it found no evidence Cox promoted infringement. Courts may similarly consider whether product designers and AI teams sufficiently ensure that their documentation and marketing materials reinforce lawful use and do not implicitly encourage misuse.

The Bottom Line

The Supreme Court's decision clarifies that service providers' contributory liability for copyright infringement turns on intent and not a generalized awareness of user wrongdoing. It also reinforces the importance of responsible product design and anti-infringement policies. The decision is narrow, however, leaving vicarious liability, and potentially other theories of secondary liability for copyright infringement, untouched.

If you would like tailored guidance on how this ruling may affect your products, enforcement posture or risk assessment, please contact the authors or your Holland & Knight attorney.

Notes

¹ The DMCA safe harbor was not directly at issue, however, as a lower-court decision had "foreclosed that defense for the relevant period" for Cox.

² Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (holding that the sale of copying equipment does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is "capable of substantial noninfringing uses").

³ Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005) (holding that "one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties").

⁴ The Fourth Circuit previously reversed a finding that Cox was vicariously liable. See BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc'ns, Inc., 881 F.3d 293, 310-12 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that vicarious liability requires the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and that Cox's ability to terminate subscribers did not amount to a right and ability to supervise infringement). That decision was not at issue before the Supreme Court.

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