President Trump Signs 2 Quantum Executive Orders

During an Oval Office ceremony on June 22, 2026, President Donald Trump signed two executive orders (EOs) to advance U.S. quantum research and development and protect U.S. information technology (IT) systems against quantum computer-based cyberattacks.

Advancing U.S. Quantum Innovation and Commercialization

The first EO, "Ushering in the Next Frontier of Quantum Innovation," makes it the administration's policy to ensure that the U.S. leads the world in quantum information science and technology (QIST) research, manufacturing, commercialization and application. In extending beyond basic research, the EO takes into account the progress made in QIST since President Trump signed the National Quantum Initiative Act into law in 2018. Today, international competition is increasingly focused on near-term applications.

The EO requires the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (APST) Michael Kratsios, who also leads the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, to update the National Quantum Strategy within 180 days to promote QIST commercialization and deployment, support enabling technologies and encourage partnerships with U.S. industry.

The EO tasks the APST with establishing the Quantum Computer for Application Development and Discovery Science (QC-ADDS) Effort to pursue the development of a quantum computer "at a scale intended to initiate the era of quantum-enabled scientific discovery." This computer is to be housed at a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility and made available to the scientific community. APST is authorized to work with several other departments and agencies to accomplish this objective.

The QC-ADDS Effort will begin with the DOE providing technical specifications within 90 days. The DOE will explore public-private partnerships, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) will develop a plan to encourage private sector contributions to the effort, and the U.S. Department of War (DOW) is tasked with developing national security tools and capabilities (including through a potential center). The EO also calls for the development of an assessment center and other coordination and analysis capabilities.

Turning to quantum sensing and networking, the EO requires the DOW to prioritize fielding at least three "next-generation quantum sensor projects" by September 30, 2028, while the DOC, DOE, National Science Foundation (NSF) and NASA are each tasked with developing sensing and networking plans.

With respect to quantum supply chains, the EO requires plans from several departments to strengthen the QIST ecosystem, promote private-sector partnerships through prizes, advance market commitments and other means, and reduce regulatory barriers. The EO tasks the DOW with increasing domestic access to relevant foundries and NSF with establishing QIST user facilities, and it reconstitutes the National Quantum Initiative Advisory Committee.

The EO takes a variety of steps to increase protections for quantum research and development and critical information from adversarial threats, including by enlisting several law enforcement and intelligence agencies coordinated through an expanded interagency Quantum Information Science and Technology Counterintelligence Protection Team.

The EO also addresses the development of the U.S. quantum workforce by requiring a multiagency QIST recruitment and retention strategy, tracking quantum-related labor statistics, promoting training opportunities and creating NSF National QIST Workforce Development Institutes.

In addition, the EO directs engagement with international partners to advance market access, supply chain-building, research cooperation and technology protection while preventing countries of concern from obtaining critical technologies and addressing foreign trade barriers and related policies.

Accelerating Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration

The second EO, "Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks," is designed to address the potential of sufficiently advanced quantum computers to break most current cryptographic security systems. Though the advent of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer may be several years away, adversaries are harvesting sensitive information now with the expectation that it will still be relevant when they are able to decrypt it. Thus, the need to move to new methods of encryption that are quantum-resistant is immediate.

The EO tasks the Office of Management and Budget and the national cyber director with leading a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration policy and strategy supported by technical assistance from a variety of agencies. The EO also provides an accelerated timeline for PQC migration, requiring high-value assets and high-impact systems to use PQC for key establishment by December 31, 2030, and digital signatures by December 31, 2031.

The EO additionally directs specific timelines for addressing PQC migration for critical infrastructure, allied governments and national security systems, as well as the development of a cryptographic bill of materials. It also directs an interagency effort to identify cost-saving opportunities within the migration.

Of particular interest to federal contractors, the EO directs that the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) be updated to require covered contractors to comply with National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards requirements by December 31, 2030, with a proposed rule due in 180 days. Similarly, FAR is to be updated to require that covered contractors implement updated vulnerability disclosure policies, with a proposed rule due in 270 days.

Looking Forward

Together, these two EOs help chart the course for U.S. quantum policy for at least the next two years and, if paired with reauthorization of the National Quantum Initiative, could have an even greater impact on U.S. quantum competitiveness.

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