Drones and National Security: What to Expect from Congress and Federal Agencies

Federal agencies and the U.S. Congress are addressing drone-related security risks with new regulatory actions, enforcement measures and funding initiatives already underway.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have proposed measures to address security issues concerning operations of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS or drones), as described in a recent Holland & Knight alert.

In addition to FAA and FCC measures concerning civil aircraft operations, members of Congress have been active in addressing potential drone threats or risks with numerous counter-unmanned aircraft systems (cUAS) provisions, as well as drone security measures, in the fiscal year (FY) 2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and Defense Appropriations bills.

The federal government is likely to increase its interest and actions in taking measures to address drone threats following recent statements concerning the foiling of a proposed attack using drones planned to occur during UFC Freedom 250, a high‑profile event on June 14, 2026, on the South Lawn of the White House as part of President Donald Trump's 80th birthday weekend.¹

FAA-Issued Temporary Flight Restrictions

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has announced the interception and seizure of drones at FIFA World Cup events.² Certain FBI offices and other governmental entities have announced additional, more recent confiscation of drones on social media pages. The cadence of such enforcement measures is likely to remain consistent or increase, given the large-scale events that will occur for upcoming America 250 celebrations.

Such enforcement actions underscore the need for consistent compliance with flight restrictions. The FAA, in its role of overseeing safety and certain aspects of security for all civil aircraft operations in the national airspace system, maintains unequivocal authority to issue temporary flight restrictions (TFRs), prohibiting aircraft operations in certain areas. Drone operators are required to comply with restrictions based on such TFRs.³

The FAA issued an array of TFRs in coordination with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) May 28, 2026, in the interest of protecting World Cup matches in the U.S.⁴ The TFRs prohibit, during match days, all aircraft from operating within a 3-nautical mile radius and up to 3,000 feet above ground level around stadiums, unless otherwise authorized by FAA air traffic control. The FAA stated restrictions will also apply to drones at certain "World Cup fan-event locations"; the FAA's webpage that lists TFRs might also include other locations, such as team hotels, base camps and training facilities.

Drone operators who enter restricted airspace without authorization might be subject to monetary penalties up to $100,000, drone confiscation or federal criminal charges. The FAA stated that federal law enforcement remains committed to identifying operators, seizing drones and supporting prosecution.

Implementation of the SAFER SKIES Act

TFRs are only one of certain distinct security measures that the FAA and DHS are using to ensure safety at large-scale events. The FY 2026 NDAA included the SAFER SKIES Act (Act), which permits state, local, Tribal or territorial government entities to use technological solutions, such as jamming a drone's signal or otherwise halting its capabilities from afar, to stymie threats.

The Act was largely the result of advocacy from more than 30 governors who wrote to congressional leadership in September 2025, calling on Congress to enact legislation that strengthens and clarifies the coordination between federal and state authorities to address increasing threats posed by drones.⁵ The administration's policy statement concerning the Act indicated Congress was concerned about security because "over the next three years, the United States will host numerous major events that necessitate new authorities necessary to combat emerging security threats."⁶

Pursuant to the Act, qualified government entities can legally detect, track, disrupt, seize or disable drones that pose a credible threat to public safety, such as at large-scale events or critical infrastructure. Such government entities, subject to robust oversight of the DOJ and DHS, may exercise this authority only upon enrolling in a program and after completing training. Moreover, government entities are permitted to use only specific, federally authorized counter-drone technologies and must report any mitigation or defensive action they take to DOJ and DHS within 48 hours of taking such action.

Personnel from such government entities have been completing training sessions as required by the Act at the FBI's National Counter-UAS Training Center, established following Executive Order (EO) 14305, "Restoring American Airspace Sovereignty."⁷ The order directed the creation of such a center to certify law enforcement and security personnel in the safe and effective use of detection and mitigation technologies. The center opened in November 2025 in Huntsville, Alabama.

FY 2027 National Security Legislation and Funding Actions

The administration's FY 2027 budget request for the U.S. Department of War (DOW) represents the largest proposed investment in drone warfare and counter-drone technology in U.S. history. Moreover, the NDAA for FY 2027 bills marked up by the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services include numerous provisions of significance to the incorporation of UAS and cUAS platforms into national defense operations.

Defense Budget Request

DOW's budget request proposes more than $74 billion for drone and counter-drone technologies, triple the amount from FY 2026. This funding falls across organizations throughout DOW, but significant coordinating offices that would manage this funding include the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG), Drone Dominance Program, led by the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF 401), the lead DOW organization responsible for synchronizing C-UAS efforts across DOW. Major categories of funding in the budget request include:

• $20.6 billion for cUAS to address the threat of unmanned systems to defense assets and military bases, a 424 percent increase over the FY 2026 enacted level
• $16.9 billion to procure unmanned systems across air, surface, subsurface and ground domains
• $13.5 billion to establish a commercially integrated logistics network that is capable of sustaining autonomous operations under contested conditions

However, the vast majority of this funding is contained within DOW's $350 billion mandatory budget request rather than its $1.15 trillion discretionary defense budget request. Therefore, this infusion of funding will most likely require separate reconciliation legislation separate from the regular appropriations process, similar to the $150 billion in defense funding enacted as part of reconciliation legislation in July 2025. The future prospects of an additional reconciliation bill that includes this additional defense funding is unclear at this time.

House Department of War Appropriations Act

The U.S. House Appropriations Committee advanced its $1.072 trillion FY 2027 defense bill along party lines on June 24, 2026. The U.S. Senate has yet to release its own version of the annual defense appropriations legislation.

The U.S. House of Representatives bill includes funding for a variety of drone and counter-drone efforts across DOW, but it did not include tens of billions of dollars in mandatory funding requested in the budget request as detailed above, which would most likely need to be adopted in separate legislation. Several items of note included in the House bill include:

• $1 billion for the DAWG, focused on development of enhanced, extended-range UAS capabilities
• $1.4 billion for JIATF 401, including $580 million on a new dedicated funding line for prototyping new counter-UAS capabilities
• $50 million for continued joint U.S.-Israel counter-UxS and directed energy development

The Appropriations Committee also included new provisions in its bill that permit flexibility in the use of funds provided for research and development for both the DAWG and JIATF 401. These provisions permit a broader range of activities than would typically be permissible with research and development funds, such as procurement, production, and operations and maintenance activities. A similar provision was also included for the DIU's Fielding account that would permit similar flexibility for its drone dominance activities.

NDAA

Both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees advanced their respective versions of the annual FY2027 NDAA in June 2026. Authorizing approximately $1.15 trillion of defense funding, both committees adopted extensive provisions of relevance to the UAS and cUAS industry. Additionally, numerous members of both the House and the Senate have introduced amendments to be considered by their respective chambers during upcoming floor debate of the 2027 NDAA in the coming weeks.

Several provisions of note adopted by the Armed Services committees include:

• Coordination and Consolidation in Drone Acquisitions and Requirements. Both the House and Senate bills include numerous provisions intended to increase coordination and accountability across DOW with regards to the development and incorporation of UAS systems:
  • Section 917 of the Senate bill would permit the Secretary of War to establish a new Robotic and Autonomous Systems Combatant Command (RASCOM) to streamline drone acquisition and fielding. This provision would further permit each military service to establish a service component-level command, as well as a new Joint Subordinate Unified Command responsible for "generating requirements for robotic and autonomous systems."
  • Section 921 of the Senate bill would, among other things, require the U.S. Departments of the Navy and Air Force to consolidate responsibilities to a single official for UAS requirements, doctrine and force generation.
  • Section 1044 of the Senate bill would also require DOW to conduct a drone posture review to identify gaps and capabilities.
  • Section 834 of the House bill would establish a new program called the "Autonomy Integration Account" for DOW to accelerate the resourcing and integration of autonomous mission execution capabilities, as well as require new standards developed by the Secretary of War and DAWG for any portfolio acquisition executive who leads an unmanned system portfolio.
  • Section 1089 of the House bill would require DAWG to develop a military doctrine for the deployment of UAS to include concepts for their operational use, force structure requirement and compliance with safety and legal requirements. Sections 1089A and 1089B of the House bill would further require a strategy for the sustainment of certain UAS platforms, as well as a strategy for the use of low-cost Group 4 and Group 5 drones that are specifically designed for contested logistics operations.⁸
• U.S.-Ukraine UAS and Counter-UAS Collaboration. Section 1223 of the Senate bill would require the establishment of a U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Defense Innovation Working Group. This includes activities such as establishing trade foundational agreements and a mutual technology transfer framework between the U.S. and Ukraine. The section would also require recommendations relevant to incorporation of Ukraine-designed covered systems into DOW programs, including Blue UAS,⁹ the Drone Dominance Program¹⁰ and service acquisition programs. The section would further require the working group to focus on UAS and c-UAS capabilities as it identifies systems for potential co-development, co-production and acquisition. This provision expands upon the six working groups previously stood up across DOW to facilitate greater collaboration with Ukraine in the UAS and c-UAS space, which the House Armed Services Committee highlighted favorably in its committee report.
• U.S.-Israel Collaboration. Both bills incorporated provisions intended to continue and expand upon U.S.-Israel defense collaboration, including in the cUAS space. Section 1223 of the House bill would extend the existing authority for cooperation on cUAS systems one additional year through December 2029, while Section 1216 of the Senate bill would increase the annual authorized amount for these activities from $70 million to $100 million. As noted above, the House Defense Appropriations bill specifically recommended $50 million for these activities. Both bills also included similar provisions (Section 219 in the House and Section 1217 in the Senate) establishing a U.S.-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative, which would synchronize cooperative efforts in a variety of areas including autonomous systems and c-UAS systems.
• Procurement of Foreign-Made Drones and Components. Section 847 of the Senate bill expands the list of components of UAS that may not be operated or procured by DOW. Additional added components that are limited from manufacture by covered foreign countries include communication devices, navigation systems, and cameras and sensors. It also expands a list of items in a UAS that may not be developed in a covered foreign country to include UAS that use batteries, battery cells, battery management systems, motors or electronic speed controllers.¹¹

FY 2026 NDAA Implementation Actions

Implementation of risk mitigation measures and other mandates concerning drone security in the FY 2026 NDAA are also underway. As noted in a May 2026 Holland & Knight alert, the FY 2026 NDAA included the following provisions, among many others concerning drones:

• Section 8602 – Drone Countermeasures to Protect Public Safety and Critical Infrastructure. Amending the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to include drone protection measures for critical infrastructure and public safety.
• Section 8603 – Use of Grant Funds for UAS and c-UAS. Amending the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 by authorizing UAS and c-UAS as eligible programs for federal funding.
• Section 8604 – Use of Grant Funds for Unmanned Aircraft. Amending the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to authorize federal grant money to purchase and operate UAS to benefit public safety.
• Section 8606 – Rulemaking and Implementation. Requiring the DHS Secretary to establish standards for training programs on the safe and lawful interception of drones.

Implementation of the several drone-related provisions in the FY 2026 NDAA is underway and some federal funding has been disseminated. In December 2025, for example, DHS' Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) awarded $250 million to 11 states hosting the World Cup.¹² The rapidly issued awards occurred soon after President Trump's public statement emphasizing support for quick implementation of the Act.¹³

How Holland & Knight Can Help

Holland & Knight will continue to monitor the upcoming discussions and amendments to the current versions of the FY 2027 NDAA. Congress is actively considering the need for U.S. drone dominance, consistent with President Trump's direction to agencies tasked with addressing or using drones and counter-drone technologies.

As upcoming large-scale events occur, such as continuing World Cup matches and America 250 celebrations, the government is likely to become increasingly vocal and active in taking measures to ensure safety of U.S. airspace, while Congress will observe such measures in considering the needs described in the proposed versions of the FY 2027 NDAA.

Stakeholders and interested parties should ensure they are following the fast-paced discussions and make business decisions accordingly. If you have any questions about how this may impact your business, please contact the authors or another member of Holland & Knight's Public Policy & Regulation Group.

Notes

¹ Shortly after news of the planned attack became public, FBI Director Kash Patel said, "Thanks to the rapid action of this FBI, our partners, and the Department of Justice in a multi-state operation, multiple individuals are now in custody and allegedly planned attacks were stopped cold."

² TSA, "Eight Drones Seized and Two Violation Notices Issued During June 16 FIFA World Cup Events" (June 18, 2026).

³ 14 C.F.R. § 107.47 (applicable to small UAS operations); 14 C.F.R. § 99.7 (requiring compliance with special security instructions issued by the administrator in the interest of national security, with regard to operations of any aircraft in an Air Defense Identification Zone or Defense Area); 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.137 through 91.145 (requiring compliance with Notices to Air Missions (NOTAMs) concerning prohibited areas).

⁴ FAA, FAA Establishes 'No Drone Zones' for FIFA World Cup 2026 Stadiums, Fan Events and Base Camps" (May 28, 2026).

⁵ National Governors Association, "Governors Urge Federal Action to Address Unmanned Aircraft Systems - National Governors Association" (Sept. 10, 2025) (stating, "[t]he use of both commercial and homemade drones to destroy personnel and equipment in the Ukrainian-Russian War serves as a stark reminder of their lethal potential" and that, "[t]he growing sophistication of these systems and devices highlights the urgency of addressing certain vulnerabilities within our own borders").

⁶ Office of Management and Budget, "Statement of Administration Policy S.1071, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026" (Dec. 9, 2025).

⁷ EO 14305 at ¶ 9(b) (June 6, 2025). The EO also established a federal task force to strengthen America's airspace security.

⁸ DOW categorizes drones into five groups based on weight, operating altitude and airspeed. Such groupings determine mission roles, necessary infrastructure and other criteria for safe and compliant operations. The groups are useful because they directly dictate cost profiles facilitate planning for matching the appropriate drone to the right mission. Groups 4 and 5 are the largest categories with regard to the size of the drone: These groupings refer to drones that weigh more than 1,320 pounds and generally require runways for takeoff and landing.

⁹ As described in a previous Holland & Knight alert, the Blue UAS Cleared List consists of UAS and UAS critical components included on the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA) Blue UAS Cleared List; such UAS and components are subject to rigorous review and oversight of the DCMA to ensure they are appropriate DOW use. Companies that seek to have UAS and UAS critical components included on the Blue UAS Cleared List undergo rigorous cyber and hardware assessments to ensure their technology complies with hardware, software, supply chain and data privacy standards, consistent with various provisions from prior years' NDAAs.

¹⁰ Based on a July 10, 2025, memorandum from Secretary of War Pete Hegseth to senior Pentagon leadership, commanders of the combatant commands and cirectors of defense agencies, "Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance," Secretary Hegseth stated the government seeks to "bolster the nascent U.S. drone manufacturing base by approving hundreds of American products for purchase by our military." Secretary Hegseth clarified DOW's "overt preference is to Buy American."

¹¹ Under Section 848(a)(1) and (d) of the NDAA for FY 2020, Pub. L. 116-92, 113 Stat. 1508 (Dec. 20, 2019) ("Prohibition on Operation or Procurement of Foreign-Made Unmanned Aircraft Systems"), the Secretary of War may not operate or enter into or renew a contract for the procurement of a covered unmanned aircraft system that is manufactured in a covered foreign country or by an entity domiciled in a covered foreign country; the statute defined "covered foreign country" as the People's Republic of China. As described in a previous Holland & Knight alert, subsequent versions of the NDAA included additional restrictions on the federal government's use or procurement of certain drones.

¹² FEMA, In a Historic Announcement, FEMA Rapidly Awards $250 Million to Secure U.S. Skies Ahead of the FIFA World Cup 2026" (Dec. 30, 2025).

¹³ The White House (Dec. 18, 2025).

Information contained in this alert is for the general education and knowledge of our readers. It is not designed to be, and should not be used as, the sole source of information when analyzing and resolving a legal problem, and it should not be substituted for legal advice, which relies on a specific factual analysis. Moreover, the laws of each jurisdiction are different and are constantly changing. This information is not intended to create, and receipt of it does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. If you have specific questions regarding a particular fact situation, we urge you to consult the authors of this publication, your Holland & Knight representative or other competent legal counsel.