November 13, 2026

Too Late for a Declination: DOJ NSD's First "Near-Miss" NPA and the Cost of Delayed Self-Disclosure

Holland & Knight Alert
Matt Rosenbaum | Ashley Akers | Alexander E. Blanchard | John L. Brownlee | Stephanie L. Connor | Megan Mocho | Madeline Schonberger

Highlights

  • The National Security Division (NSD) of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) recently announced its first "near-miss" non-prosecution agreement (NPA) under its Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP).
  • The NPA, together with a parallel settlement with the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), resolved investigations of Extreme Networks Inc. (Extreme Networks) for apparent sanctions and export controls violations involving sales of networking equipment and related services to a Russian defense manufacturer majority-owned by a sanctioned entity.
  • Extreme Networks' disclosure came too late to qualify for a declination under the CEP, but its cooperation and remediation earned it the CEP's "near-miss" benefits and significant credit in the parallel OFAC settlement.
  • For companies, the case is a reminder that sanctions and export controls diligence should be built into mergers and acquisitions integration, distributor oversight and foreign affiliate supervision.

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced on October 27, 2026, its first near-miss non-prosecution agreement (NPA) under the Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP), resolving its investigation into Extreme Networks' sales of networking equipment and related services to the Moscow Machinery Building Plant Avangard (MMZA), a sanctioned Russian defense manufacturer.

The settlements underscore both the value and the limits of self-disclosure and cooperation. DOJ rewarded Extreme Networks' cooperation and remediation with a reduced fine and no monitor but withheld a declination because the disclosure was forced only by imminent public disclosure in the press. The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), by contrast, treated the same disclosure as voluntary when calculating its penalty.

Extreme Networks agreed to pay $975,721.84 to DOJ and $1,529,685 to OFAC. Because OFAC credited $487,861 of its penalty against the DOJ payments, the company paid approximately $2.02 million in total penalties. The case also shows how sanctions and export controls exposure can arise from gaps in end-user diligence and ownership screening, even when the customer is not itself listed and the misconduct is limited to a small group of employees at a foreign subsidiary.

Extreme Networks and the CEP "Near Miss"

The CEP is DOJ's department-wide framework for encouraging companies to self-report corporate misconduct, cooperate with government investigations and remediate. For companies that make a voluntary self-disclosure (VSD), the best-case outcome is a declination. A "near miss" is not a declination by another name; it is a middle-ground outcome for a company that earns substantial credit but falls short of the CEP's declination requirements.

As outlined in Holland & Knight's previous alert, DOJ will decline to prosecute under the CEP if:

  • The company voluntarily self-discloses the misconduct to an appropriate DOJ component.
  • The company fully cooperates with the investigation.
  • The company timely and appropriately remediates the identified misconduct.
  • No aggravating circumstances exist that would warrant prosecution.

Part II of the CEP establishes a near-miss path for companies that fall short of a declination but still earn meaningful credit. It applies when a company "fully cooperated and timely and appropriately remediated" but cannot receive a declination for either or both of two reasons:

  1. It self-reported in good faith, but the report "did not qualify as a voluntary self-disclosure" (for example, because it came too late).
  2. "[I]t had aggravating factors that warrant a criminal resolution."

In those cases, the CEP provides four benefits. DOJ will:

  1. Offer an NPA rather than a guilty plea or indictment, unless there are "particularly egregious or multiple aggravating circumstances"
  2. "Allow a term length of fewer than three years"
  3. "Not require an independent compliance monitor"
  4. Reduce the fine by "at least 50% but not more than 75% off the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines" fine range

DOJ alleged that Extreme Networks, through certain Russia-based employees and agents, sold products and services ultimately intended for MMZA while misrepresenting the true end user in export filings, including by using Dmitrovskiy Experimental Mechanical Plant (DEMZ) or a distributor as the listed consignee. DOJ also emphasized that the misconduct was committed by a small group of employees at a foreign subsidiary who concealed the activity from U.S.-based compliance personnel, that the subsidiary had been acquired from another company and later shut down and that the conduct generated less than half a million dollars in sales revenue.

Timing was decisive. Measured against the "near-miss" criteria, Extreme Networks satisfied most of them:

  • Full Cooperation. DOJ gave full credit for Extreme Networks' rolling responses to multiple subpoenas yielding nearly 400,000 documents, making current and former employees (including foreign-based employees) available for interviews, presenting its internal investigation findings and agreeing to toll the statute of limitations.
  • Timely and Appropriate Remediation. Extreme Networks shut down its Russian subsidiary, terminated the distributor involved, expanded trade compliance training, hired additional compliance personnel and a third-party consultant, and strengthened end-user screening and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) diligence.
  • Good-Faith But Untimely Self-Report. Extreme Networks received a whistleblower complaint in April 2022 and began an internal investigation, but DOJ found that the later NSD disclosure was not timely because it followed an investigative journalist's request for comment and came only days before publication. The disclosure came six months after the company first learned of the issue and in the middle of the company's internal investigation.
  • No Cited Aggravating Circumstances. DOJ did not identify aggravating circumstances as the basis for denying a declination.

The resulting NPA reflects the "near-miss" benefits: a criminal fine reduced by half ($487,860.92), reflecting credit for cooperation and remediation, as well as no independent compliance monitor. Extreme Networks also agreed to forfeit $487,860.92 and accepted ongoing reporting and certification obligations. Although Extreme Networks avoided the cost of a monitor, it must submit to DOJ an initial remediation report and at least two follow-up reports on its compliance program and internal controls during the NPA's three-year term. Notably, that term does not reflect the "near-miss" option of a term shorter than three years.

OFAC Settlement and Compliance Considerations

In the parallel OFAC matter, Extreme Networks agreed to pay $1,529,685 to settle nine apparent violations of the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) Part 589, arising from exports of networking equipment and related services to MMZA between September 2018 and March 2022, when it ceased operations in Russia. Although MMZA was not designated on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List until June 28, 2022, under Executive Order 14024, it was majority-owned by Russian state-owned defense company JSC Concern Almaz Antey (Almaz Antey), which had been designated on July 16, 2014, pursuant to Executive Order 13661 after Russia's initial incursion into Crimea. OFAC blocking sanctions apply automatically to entities owned 50 percent or more by one or more sanctioned entities. Although Extreme Network's U.S.-led compliance team reviewed a 2018 purchase agreement naming MMZA as an end user, it did not conduct sufficient due diligence to determine that MMZA was blocked at that point or as the commercial relationship continued through 2022.

OFAC determined that the conduct was egregious and that the matter had been voluntarily self-disclosed, assessing a base civil monetary penalty equal to one-half of the statutory maximum and reaching a settlement amount of $1,529,685 after consideration of the General Factors set forth in OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines. After crediting $487,861 against the DOJ payments, OFAC required $1,041,824 to be paid to the U.S. Department of the Treasury. The settlement also requires improved acquisition diligence and foreign affiliate oversight, as well as five-year sanctions compliance commitments with annual senior-level certification and a written explanation of compliance efforts.

Practical Takeaways

Act Before External Triggers Demand Disclosure

As noted above, DOJ found the October 2022 disclosure untimely because it followed a journalist's request for comment, even though Extreme Networks had begun investigating a whistleblower complaint in April 2022. Notably, the disclosure came a mere six months after first learning of the issue and shortly after obtaining additional information in October 2022 as part of the internal investigation. Companies should treat credible allegations as an immediate VSD decision point, not merely the start of an open-ended investigation. A careful internal review may preserve cooperation credit, but, as this case shows, not necessarily the path to a declination.

The case is best read alongside DOJ's recent declination involving alleged export control violations by Robert Bosch GmbH, discussed in Holland & Knight's prior alert. There, DOJ credited Bosch's prompt disclosure to NSD, cooperation, remediation and lack of aggravating circumstances, and issued a full declination. Together, the two matters bookend the CEP framework: Prompt VSDs can support a declination, while delayed disclosures may still earn credit but can result in an NPA and criminal penalties.

Consider Disclosing to Each Relevant Agency, Not Just One

Extreme Networks notified DOJ, Treasury and the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) after expanding its investigation, and the matter resolved with both DOJ criminal penalties and an OFAC civil settlement. Companies facing potential sanctions or export control violations should identify every agency with a possible interest at the outset, because a disclosure to one regulator may not earn CEP credit with DOJ or resolve exposure with other agencies. Coordinated submissions to DOJ, OFAC, BIS and any other relevant authority should be considered early.

Treat End-User Inconsistencies as Escalation Events

The Statement of Facts and OFAC release describe red flags that appeared in different parts of the order flow: MMZA email addresses and office addresses in purchase records, distributor responses pointing to MMZA's website, end-user documentation that did not resolve inconsistencies, and portal registrations under DEMZ using MMZA email addresses. Both settlements describe these red flags as existing for years prior to disclosure. Audits conducted during the time period flagged the inconsistencies, but no meaningful diligence was conducted at the time. Companies should build controls that force escalation when the paperwork, email domain, physical address, customer portal registration or business records do not tell the same end-user story. Companies need to ensure regular and fulsome trade compliance training for customer-facing roles to identify such red flags. Audit systems similarly need to escalate inconsistencies.

Ensure Trade Compliance Covers Acquired and Foreign Affiliates

The matter began with a customer relationship and personnel inherited through an asset acquisition and continued through conduct at a foreign subsidiary. Companies should ensure that acquired businesses and foreign affiliates are promptly integrated into trade compliance processes and that compliance teams appropriately analyze inherited customers, end users, distributors and contracts. As OFAC noted in its enforcement release, the case "illustrates how ineffective oversight of foreign affiliates can create major risks for a U.S. parent company," as "risks that hatch abroad often come home to roost."

If you have questions about this Holland & Knight alert or need assistance with a specific matter, please contact the authors.


Information contained in this alert is for the general education and knowledge of our readers. It is not designed to be, and should not be used as, the sole source of information when analyzing and resolving a legal problem, and it should not be substituted for legal advice, which relies on a specific factual analysis. Moreover, the laws of each jurisdiction are different and are constantly changing. This information is not intended to create, and receipt of it does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. If you have specific questions regarding a particular fact situation, we urge you to consult the authors of this publication, your Holland & Knight representative or other competent legal counsel.


 

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