The Double Helix Bind: WuXi Walks Off Pentagon List as Washington Tightens China Biotech Grip
Delisting Offers Relief for 1 Manufacturer, But Path Narrows for China-Linked Life Sciences
Highlights
- The U.S. Department of War removed WuXi AppTec from its Section 1260H list of "Chinese military companies" to comply with an August 7, 2026, court-ordered preliminary injunction, but without prejudice to relisting.
- The Office of Management and Budget is scheduled to publish its initial BIOSECURE Act list of "biotechnology companies of concern" by December 18, 2026, under a separate process.
- The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced on October 22, 2026, a proposed rule under the Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security Act that would bar covered U.S. investments in Chinese biotechnology outright, and the pending Biotech Investment National Security Act would extend screening to licensing deals.
- U.S. biopharma's reliance on Chinese contract research and manufacturing capacity cannot be unwound quickly, so companies should map exposure and qualify alternatives now.
WuXi AppTec, one of the largest contract research, development and manufacturing organizations serving U.S. biopharma, has won a reprieve from the Section 1260H list of "Chinese military companies," but broader currents run the other way. The U.S. Department of War (DOW) removed the company from the list to comply with an August 7, 2026, court-ordered preliminary injunction, but without prejudice to relisting.1 The reprieve comes as broader restrictions on China-linked life sciences activity continue to take shape.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is scheduled to publish its initial BIOSECURE Act list of "biotechnology companies of concern" by December 18, 2026,2 while the U.S. Department of the Treasury proposed outbound investment rules under the Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security Act (COINS Act) that would prohibit covered U.S. investments in Chinese biotechnology,3 and the pending Biotech Investment National Security Act (BINSA) would extend screening to licensing deals.4 Through procurement restrictions, outbound investment rules, inbound review and sustained congressional pressure, Washington is building a layered national security perimeter around China-linked life sciences activity, even as the industry's dependence on Chinese capacity and capability continues to grow.
WuXi AppTec's Removal from the Section 1260H List
Section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (FY 2021 NDAA)5 requires the DOW Secretary to publish, at least annually through December 31, 2030, a list of Chinese military companies operating in the U.S. As the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia explained, the U.S. Congress "stacked serious consequences atop designation,"6 including a bar on DOW contracting with, or procuring products or services from, listed entities, even indirectly through third parties.7
DOW added WuXi AppTec on June 8, 2026, among 65 new entities that included Alibaba, Baidu, BYD and Novogene. DOW's stated basis was that WuXi AppTec "is indirectly owned by SASAC and is indirectly affiliated with SASTIND and the PLA,"8 referring to China's State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) and People's Liberation Army (PLA).
WuXi AppTec denied the characterization and sued on June 11, 2026. On August 7, 2026, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction, opening its opinion with "[a] scarlet letter sends a clear message: keep away," and finding that WuXi AppTec was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim under the Administrative Procedure Act and likely to suffer irreparable harm from the unlawful listing. DOW's removal notice, made public on November 9, 2026, and published in the Federal Register on November 10, 2026, states that the delisting complies with that order.
Removal Notice Consequences
The removal lifts the consequences of the 1260H listing, meaning that the DOW contracting bar no longer applies. The relief is only preliminary, however. The government has answered the complaint, and the case on the merits remains pending.
DOW maintains the ability to relist a company "on additional or supplementary grounds." That has happened before: In October 2024, DOW delisted lidar maker Hesai Technology and immediately relisted it on a new record, and Hesai later lost its court challenge.9
In addition to the 1260H listing, OMB may designate companies of concern through its own interagency process. This means that a company removed from the 1260H list is again not necessarily in the clear. Through the OMB-led interagency process, in which DOW plays a role, a delisted company could still be designated and become subject to the same federal procurement and contracting restrictions.
Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: U.S. Dependence on Chinese CROs and CDMOs
The policy debate often assumes U.S. companies can simply move work out of China, but the data suggests otherwise. In a 2024 Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO) survey of 124 biopharma companies, 79 percent reported at least one contract or product with a China-based or China-owned contract development and manufacturing organization (CDMO) or contract manufacturer. More than two-thirds of respondents were small companies with fewer than 250 employees, which typically lack in-house manufacturing and have the least leverage to secure replacement capacity.
WuXi AppTec sits at the center of that reliance. The company derived roughly 65 percent of its 2023 revenue from U.S. customers, and U.S. demand has only grown since: In the first quarter of 2025, revenue from U.S.-based customers rose 28.4 percent year over year to RMB6.38 billion (approximately $957 million), about two-thirds of total revenue.10 Through the first nine months of 2026 – the period in which it was listed, sued and enjoined – WuXi AppTec reported sales of about RMB6.8 billion (approximately $1 billion), up 39 percent, and raised its full-year guidance. The National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology has described WuXi AppTec as "so entrenched in American biopharmaceutical supply chains that American firms estimate they would need at least eight years to develop alternative sources for its services."11
Several structural factors explain why the dependence persists:
- Switching Takes Years, Not Months. In BIO's survey, 85 percent of respondents said changing vendors for preclinical and clinical work could take six months to six years, and 52 percent said moving manufacturing for marketed products could take two to eight years.12 Technology transfer, test runs, validation and U.S. Food and Drug Administration approval of a new manufacturing site all add time, and a mid-trial change of contract research organization (CRO) can delay a program or compromise data continuity.
- Alternative Capacity Is Already Tight. In BioPlan Associates' 2026 biomanufacturing survey, 49 percent of respondents reported difficulty finding a CDMO with available mammalian cell culture capacity, up from 39 percent in 2024. Western, Korean, Japanese and Indian providers are expanding, but new commercial-scale facilities take years to build and qualify.
- Integrated Scale and Cost Are Hard to Replicate. WuXi AppTec's model combines discovery chemistry, testing, process development and manufacturing under one roof at costs Western providers generally do not match. Splitting that work across several vendors adds cost and coordination risk.
- China Is Increasingly the Source of the Assets Themselves. Out-licensing of China-originated drugs reached about $136 billion in 2025. Programs licensed from Chinese innovators are often developed and manufactured by Chinese CDMOs, which deepens rather than reduces reliance.
Congress has acknowledged these concerns. BINSA sponsors frame the problem as a long-term strategic dependency comparable to U.S. exposure in rare earths and semiconductors,13 and the BIOSECURE Act's long grandfather period reflects Congress' recognition that an abrupt break would disrupt patient supply and clinical development.14 Companies should read the current respite for WuXi AppTec as time to diversify on their own schedule, not as a reason to defer the work.
The BIOSECURE Act
The BIOSECURE Act became law on December 18, 2025, as Section 851 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (FY 2026 NDAA). Rather than naming companies, it designates biotechnology companies of concern (BCCs) through DOW's 1260H list and a separate OMB list. Its prohibitions are not yet in force.
If agencies use all available time, prohibitions would begin in mid to late 2028, with grandfathering running to roughly 2033. Once in force, the act bars agencies from procuring biotechnology equipment or services from a BCC, contracting with entities that use BCC equipment or services in performing federal contracts, or funding those uses through grants or loans. The bar applies where a contractor "knows" its performance will require BCC equipment or services, and deliberate ignorance is no defense. Covered items range from genetic sequencers and related software to biological data services and any categories OMB adds. Agency waivers require OMB approval and congressional notice and last no more than 365 days, with one 180-day extension.
The act preserves Medicare Part B, Medicaid and Medicaid drug rebate eligibility, but many manufacturers are exposed through the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Federal Supply Schedule, participation in which is a prerequisite for Part B and Medicaid reimbursement. A manufacturer relying on a BCC may find it difficult to wall off VA-supplied products from the rest of its portfolio.
How BIOSECURE Will Reach Federal Contractors
The prohibitions will not apply to contractors directly from the statute. They will take effect through a sequence of steps: OMB publishes the BCC list, OMB issues implementing guidance and the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FAR) Council then amends the FAR within one year of OMB's guidance. That FAR rule is expected to resemble the Section 889 rule, which bars the government from buying, or contracting with entities that use, certain Chinese telecommunications and video surveillance equipment. Section 889 required a solicitation provision under which offerors represent whether they will provide or use covered equipment, a contract clause with reporting obligations and flowdown to subcontracts.
Section 889 also offers lessons on diligence. Under that rule and its implementing regulations in FAR 52.204-24 through 52.204-26 (now consolidated in FAR 52.240-90 as part of the Revolutionary FAR Overhaul), contractors must conduct a "reasonable inquiry" into information in their possession, though not necessarily a supply chain audit, before making their representation. BIOSECURE's "knows" standard, combined with its rejection of deliberate ignorance, suggests that a similar documented inquiry will be the minimum defensible practice. Contractors should also expect requests for information from contracting officers and prime contractors well before the FAR rule takes effect.
Of course, BIOSECURE is not the only procurement rule that matters to China-linked pharmaceutical supply chains. The Trade Agreements Act (TAA) applies to VA Federal Supply Schedule and U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) schedule contracts and generally limits acquisitions to U.S.-made or designated-country end products. China is not a designated country under the TAA.15 Other measures also add pressure on federal contractors to source domestically, including Buy American Act (BAA) preferences and executive actions promoting domestic production of essential medicines and their ingredients.
The COINS Act and Outbound Investment in Biotech
The COINS Act, enacted in the FY 2026 NDAA,16 codified the Treasury Department's Outbound Investment Security Program (OISP), which grew out of Executive Order (EO) 1410517 and previously covered semiconductors, quantum and artificial intelligence (AI).18 The act adds hypersonics and high-performance computing; extends "countries of concern" beyond China (including Hong Kong and Macau) to Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia and Venezuela under the Maduro regime; adopts a 50 percent ownership test for covered foreign persons; authorizes the Treasury Department to add sectors without new legislation; and requires implementing rules by March 13, 2027.
Covered transactions include equity and contingent equity acquisitions, debt with equity-like rights, joint ventures, greenfield operations, certain limited partner (LP) interests and knowingly directing a foreign person to undertake a transaction a U.S. person could not.19 The Treasury Department is already enforcing: On October 7, 2026, it announced a $200,000 penalty for failure to notify a $92,478 investment by a U.S. company's controlled foreign entity.
The Treasury Department's Proposed Biotech Rule
The Treasury Department's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), announced October 22, 2026, would add biotechnology as a sixth sector.20 Prohibited technology would include pharmaceuticals and their delivery systems – small molecules, polymers, vaccines, blood and blood components, allergenics, cell and gene therapies, and monoclonal antibodies and other recombinant therapeutic proteins, as well as controlled or novel toxins, advanced bio-derived materials and biofuels. Several features matter most for life sciences companies:
- No Notification Tier. Covered biotech transactions would be prohibited outright, and the $50,000 de minimis exception would not apply, although investors may seek national-interest exemptions.
- Listed-Entity Trigger. Investments in entities on the 1260H list or OMB's BCC list would be prohibited,21 which makes 1260H status and WuXi AppTec's delisting an investment question as well as a procurement one.
- Licensing Carve-Out, for Now. According to a Treasury Department official, the rule would not reach licensing by U.S. pharmaceutical companies with Chinese counterparties, so cash in-licensing (up-fronts, milestones and royalties) would remain outside the regime. New company (NewCo) structures that give a Chinese licensor equity and joint ventures are more likely to be covered.
- Diligence Burden on U.S. Persons. The Treasury Department does not plan to publish a covered foreign persons database, and the knowledge standard includes what a "reasonable and diligent inquiry" would have revealed.
BINSA Would Reach Licensing
BINSA – H.R. 9102, introduced by Reps. John Moolenaar (R-Mich.) and Debbie Dingell (D-Mich.) June 2, 2026, and S. 5316, introduced by Sens. Pete Ricketts (R-Neb.) and Elissa Slotkin (D-Mich.) August 6, 2026)22 – would write biotechnology into the COINS Act as both prohibited and notifiable technology and add "licensing of a prohibited technology from a covered foreign person" as a covered transaction.23 It directs the Treasury Department, in consultation with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, DOW and Director of National Intelligence, to issue rules within one year that give particular weight to licensing intellectual property, drug-discovery platforms, clinical capabilities and manufacturing know-how to covered foreign persons, and to the degree a transaction transfers innovation or manufacturing capacity to entities under Chinese government direction. Licensing-only deals could therefore be captured without any investment.
The bill would exclude agricultural biotechnology, nonpharmaceutical industrial fermentation and basic academic research, and it would require the DOW Secretary to report within 60 days of enactment on whether U.S. capital flows into China's biotechnology sector harm national security and military readiness.
BINSA also reaches vendors: A CRO or CDMO arrangement involving technology transfer, know-how sharing, licensing rights or governance features could fall within the bill, so BIOSECURE supply chain diligence and outbound investment diligence should be coordinated.
The U.S. Senate bill has seen no action since its referral to the Banking Committee on August 6, 2026.
Because the geopolitical relationship between the U.S. and China remains volatile, expect BINSA and other legislative and regulatory proposals to resurface next year.
The Broader National Security Picture
Washington now treats biotechnology as both a strategic asset and a strategic vulnerability, much as it treats semiconductors and AI. Each regime pulls a different lever:
|
Regime |
Lever |
Life Sciences Touchpoint |
|
Section 1260H list (DOW) |
Defense procurement; public designation |
DOW contracting bar; triggers BIOSECURE and proposed OISP prohibitions |
|
BIOSECURE Act (OMB/FAR) |
Federal contracts, grants and loans |
Use of BCC equipment or services by contractors and grantees |
|
COINS Act/OISP (Treasury Department) |
Outbound investment |
Equity, joint ventures, LP interests and NewCo structures |
|
BINSA (pending) |
Outbound investment and licensing |
Out-licensing, technology transfer and vendor know-how sharing |
|
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) |
Inbound investment review |
Foreign investment in U.S. businesses holding genomic or other sensitive personal data24 |
|
Export controls (U.S. Department of Commerce) |
Export Administration Regulations; Entity List |
Pathogens and toxins (Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 1C351), genetic elements (1C353), biological processing equipment (2B352) and related technology (2E001, 2E002, 2E301);25 Entity List status also triggers OISP prohibitions26 |
Because these regimes now cross-reference one another, a single designation can affect procurement, investment and supply chain decisions at once, and compliance with one does not satisfy another. Congressional pressure is bipartisan, from U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party Chair Moolenaar's May 21, 2026, letter urging the Treasury Department to treat biotech as prohibited technology to BINSA's bicameral sponsorship.
The WuXi AppTec case also confirms that designations are reviewable in court, which may lead agencies to build stronger records and, in turn, more durable designations.
What Companies Should Do Now
Life Sciences Companies
- Understand the legal and regulatory requirements and prohibitions imposed by this regulatory scheme.
- Map China touchpoints, including CRO, CDMO, sequencing and data relationships and exposure through third-country entities 50 percent or more owned by persons of a country of concern.
- Qualify alternatives early. Given multiyear switching timelines and tight global capacity, begin dual-sourcing and technology-transfer planning for critical programs before a designation forces the issue.
- Review out-licensing and collaboration pipelines for BINSA exposure and consider the timing of pending deals.
Investors and Funds
- Screen pipeline and portfolio, including LP and co-investment interests, against the proposed prohibition.
- Build in regulatory flexibility through regulatory-change termination rights, conditions precedent, covered-activity representations and alternatives such as cash licensing in lieu of equity.
- Document diligence and supervise controlled foreign entities because the Treasury Department's first penalty involved one.
- Comment by December 7, 2026. The Treasury Department has asked for input on the definition of covered biological systems and the scope of pharmaceutical compounds.
Government Contractors and Grantees
- Trace BCC exposure through subcontractor and supplier tiers and document supplier verification.
- Consider exercising previously negotiated options before the FAR effective date to extend grandfathered performance.
- Assess Federal Supply Schedule exposure for products made with Chinese CDMO support.
How Holland & Knight Can Help
Holland & Knight's Life Sciences, Public Policy & Regulation, CFIUS and Industrial Security, International Trade and Government Contracts teams advise life sciences companies, investors and federal contractors on supply chain diligence, outbound and inbound investment review, deal structuring and comment strategy. For more information, contact the authors.
Notes
1 Notice of Removal of Designated Chinese Military Company, FR Doc. No. 2026-22840 (Nov. 10, 2026) (Docket ID DOD-2026-OS-2410); WuXi AppTec Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., No. 26-2069 (JEB), mem. op. (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2026).
2 Outbound Investment Security Program Regulations, FR Doc. No. 2026-21786 (proposed Oct. 26, 2026) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 850–851).
3 FY 2026 NDAA, Pub. L. No. 119-60, § 851(f)(1), 139 Stat. 718, 984 (2025).
4 H.R. 9102, 119th Cong. (2026); S. 5316, 119th Cong. § 3 (2026).
5 Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 1260H, 134 Stat. 3388, 3965–66 (2021) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 113 note).
6 WuXi AppTec Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., No. 26-2069 (JEB), mem. op. at 1 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2026) (granting motion for preliminary injunction).
7 FY 2024 NDAA, Pub. L. No. 118-31, § 805, 137 Stat. 136, 315 (2023), as amended by FY 2026 NDAA, Pub. L. No. 119-60, § 845, 139 Stat. 718, 977 (2025).
8 91 Fed. Reg. at 35,194.
9 Hesai Tech. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 792 F. Supp. 3d 22 (D.D.C. 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-5256 (D.C. Cir.).
10 WuXi AppTec Co., 2025 First Quarterly Report (2025) (reporting total revenue of RMB 9.65 billion).
11 Greg Slabodkin, WuXi AppTec and WuXi Biologics Get Reprieve in Latest Version of BIOSECURE Act, Pharma Manufacturing (Sept. 15, 2025) (quoting National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology).
12 Angus Liu, Millions Could Be Harmed by Sudden Decoupling of Chinese CDMOs, Fierce Pharma (May 9, 2024).
13 S. 5316, 119th Cong. § 2(b) (2026).
14 Pub. L. No. 119-60, § 851(c)(3)(A), 139 Stat. 718 (2025).
15 FAR 52.225-5.
16 Pub. L. No. 119-60, 139 Stat. 718 (2025) (adding Title VIII to the Defense Production Act of 1950, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 4581 et seq.).
17 EO 14105, 88 Fed. Reg. 54,867 (Aug. 11, 2023).
18 31 C.F.R. pt. 850.
19 Defense Production Act of 1950 § 809(4)(A), 50 U.S.C. § 4589(4)(A).
20 Outbound Investment Security Program Regulations, FR Doc. No. 2026-21786 (proposed Oct. 26, 2026).
21 Proposed 31 C.F.R. § 851.226(v), FR Doc. No. 2026-21786 (proposed Oct. 26, 2026).
22 H.R. 9102, 119th Cong. (2026); S. 5316, 119th Cong. (2026); Press Release, H. Select Comm. on the CCP, Moolenaar, Dingell Introduce Legislation to Prevent Offshoring Biotech Industry to China (June 2, 2026).
23 S. 5316 § 3.
24 31 C.F.R. § 800.241.
25 15 C.F.R. pt. 774, supp. no. 1; 15 C.F.R. § 742.2.
26 31 C.F.R. § 850.224; Proposed 31 C.F.R. § 851.226, FR Doc. No. 2026-21786 (proposed Oct. 26, 2026).
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